【正文】 find a pragmatic balance between a theoretically stringent model and pragmatic promises needed for the framework to survive. A central feature of the budget process is that decisions are the result of negotiations between numerous players— the president, prime minister, the minister of finance, individual line ministers, agency executives, civil servants, and parliamentarians— and that the balance of fiscal authority has an impact on the oute. Any alteration of the existing order will be acceptable only if a player’s loss of influence in one area is pensated by increased influence in some other area. Strengthening the topdown character of the budget process— which, to a large extent, is intended to address a fragmentation of fiscal powers and the suboptimal collective equilibria this generates— has to take into account the redistribution of roles and responsibilities. From the point of view of the ministry of finance— or in parliament, the finance or budget mittee— influence over the details of the budget is relinquished in return for greater power over aggregate parameters. From the perspective of the line ministries— or the sectoral mittees— a topdown process introduces rigidities and constraints on total expenditure and sectoral allocations, which reduces the scope for expanding sector interests. This may only be acceptable if countervailed by increased flexibility within the respective sector, and if the reform is credible in the sense that the new procedure is binding for all ministries. The single most important decision for the government is to determine the size of government. In a topdown process, this issue is formalized by setting a limit on total expenditure at the very early stage of budget preparation. As discussed by Ljungman (2020), there are arguments for establishing such limits well in advance of the start of the budget process through binding mediumterm aggregate expenditure ceilings. Although not derived directly from a topdown concept, a mediumterm approach to fiscal policy formulation and budgeting is important to ensure that aggregate expenditure limits serve the intended purpose. From one perspective, the overall expenditure limit can be viewed as a highly ideological decision. The size of the budget is a reflection of a mitment to provide goods, services, and social protection, and provides the amount of resources that are to be consumed, invested, or transferred. Such a fundamental decision has to be made by political assemblies(., the cabi of ministers and parliament). From another angle, the determination of the expenditure limit is a technical issue, which requires the expertise of professionals in the ministry of finance. A qualified assessment of the room for expenditure has to be based on a projection of available resources— in terms of expected revenue— and an analysis of the adequate fiscal policy given prevailing economic conditions. Parallel to these two perspectives is the risk of insufficient accuracy of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. A bias can, in some cases, be explained by inadequate forecasting techniques. Another possibility is the existence of political pressure to paint a positive development. Such a tendency does not have to e as direct interference with the forecasts, but could be the result of civil servants’ unwillingness to present bad news. An implicit assumption in a topdown approach is that the budget process is prehensive, in the sense that all— or at least a significant part of— expenditure is covered by the government budget