【正文】 f another attribute, are discussed later.) More important, our nondebt tax shield attribute represents tax deductions rather than tax deductions of true economic depreciation and expenses, which is the economic attribute suggested by theory. Unfortunately, this preferable attribute would be very difficult to measure. C. Growth As we mentioned previously, equitycontrolled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm39。s managers have better information than outside shareholders. Issuing debt secured by property with known values avoids these costs. For this reason, firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue more debt to take advantage of this opportunity. Work by Galai and Masulis , Jensen and Meckling , and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest yet to expropriate wealth from the firm39。本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)） 外 文 翻 譯 原文 ： The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice I. Determinants of Capital Structure In this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firm39。s debtequity choice. These attributes are denoted asset structure, nondebt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observable indicators are discussed below. A. Collateral Value of Assets Most capital structure theories argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selling secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured put forth by Myers and Majluf also suggest that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firm39。s bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation between debt ratios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be collateralized, the borrower is restricted to use the funds for a specified project. Since no such guarantee can be used for projects that cannot be collateralized, creditors may require more favorable terms, which in turn may lead such firms to use equity rather than debt financing. The tendency of managers to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites may produce the opposite relation between collateralized capital and debt levels. Grossman and Hart suggest that higher debt levels diminish this tendency because of the increased threat of bankruptcy. Managers of highly levered firms will also be less able to consume excessive perquisites since bondholders (or bankers) are inclined to closely monitor such firms. The costs associated with this agency relation may be higher for firms with assets that are less collateralized since monitoring the capital outlays of such firms is probably more difficult. For this reason, firms with less collateralized assets may choose higher debt levels to limit their managers39。s bondholders. The cost associated with this agency relationship is likely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. Expected future growth should thus be negatively related to longterm debt levels. Myers, however, noted that this agency problem is mitigated if the firm issues shortterm rath