【正文】 個(gè)幾乎無法克服的挑戰(zhàn) ，以一 般邏輯去考慮，每次查看價(jià)格，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表都要被更新。方 法是要求將某些資產(chǎn)按 公允價(jià)值記錄 而 其他資產(chǎn) 仍然 是按成本 記錄 。第二，這將是完全的錯(cuò)誤。因此，“成本”法有兩個(gè)結(jié)果。 對于財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的目的 而言， 結(jié)果將是其報(bào)告價(jià)值將大大下降。一 FASB 的成員在一次會(huì)議上通過辦公樓的例子指出了這點(diǎn)。 尤其 是那些 在活躍的市場 上交易的資產(chǎn) 如金融工具。 但是，這只是 爭論 的一個(gè)方面 而已 。為了 使估值更加可靠，這種具體的證據(jù)可以由外部 的審計(jì)員對 財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表 獨(dú)立審查 。 那些倡導(dǎo)“成本法”計(jì)算資產(chǎn)的認(rèn)為成本在交易發(fā)生時(shí)能最好、最合理、最能客觀反應(yīng)“公允價(jià)值”。那就是資產(chǎn)是否以“成本”記錄或以它們的“公允”（或市場）價(jià)值記錄會(huì)更好?！痹跁?huì)計(jì)師中，這一概念作為“出口價(jià)格”被稱為速記。 幕后： FAS 157 對于那些傾向于責(zé)怪會(huì)計(jì) 來說 ，真正 致使次優(yōu)混亂的罪魁禍?zhǔn)资且粋€(gè)公允的新標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，也就是在 2020年 9 月發(fā)布的美國財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第 157 條又稱 FAS 157 以及預(yù)定在今年十一月生效、針對某類資產(chǎn)估值的 GAS 157， 即資產(chǎn)應(yīng)當(dāng)按公允價(jià)值記錄 。 盡管如此， 我們應(yīng)該 為了解決次級而稍后責(zé)怪會(huì)計(jì) 師或 要求新的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 。 這當(dāng)然是 從一個(gè)角度 來看待它 。 該論點(diǎn)是，新的會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則要求 劃減 ， 這 實(shí)際上夸大 了 損失， 這樣 金融市場推動(dòng)的水平，是人為地壓低 的。 1 FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING AND SUBPRIME Michael r. Young INTRODUCTION A proposition creeping its way into the discussion about the financial market dislocations arising from subprime loans is that it’s really our accounting system that is to blame. The argument is that new accounting rules are requiring writedowns that actually exaggerate losses and that financial markets are thereby being driven to levels that are artificially low. A consequence, as summarized by The Wall Street Journal, is a ―rebellion‖ by those who are ―blaming accounting rules‖ for exaggerated losses and calling for new rules that would, in essence, dampen financial market volatility. That is certainly one way of looking at it. And, no doubt, the billions in writedowns of mortgagebacked instruments and acpanying volatility in financial markets since this past summer have been no fun. Still, we should be slow to blame the accountants or new accounting standards for the subprime meltdown. To the contrary, some may be expected to point out that the aftermath of the subprime difficulties has put to the test a financial reporting system that has responded as it should. BEHIND THE SCENES: FAS 157 For those inclined to blame the accounting, the real culprit in the subprime mess is a fairly new standard, ―Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157‖ or ―FAS 157.‖ Issued in September 2020 and scheduled to take effect this past November, GAS 157 speaks to the valuation of certain kinds of assets, namely assets that should be recorded at fair value. Applicable to, among other things, financial instruments of the sort relevant to subprime loans, the standard specifies that such assets are to be recorded at the price for which they could be sold, that is, ―the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.‖ Among accountants, this concept is referred to in shorthand as the ―exit price.‖ In speaking to the proper valuation of assets, FAS 157 is the latest contribution to one of the oldest debates in accounting. That is whether assets are better recorded at ―cost‖ or at their ―fair‖（ or market）value. The issue is one that has been vigorously debated for years, one of the reasons being that each side has had excellent arguments to support its position. Advocates of the ―cost‖ approach assert that cost is the best, most reliable, and most objective indication of ―fair value‖ at the time a transaction takes place. The existence of an invoice or a contract typically makes the evidence supporting the asset value all but irrefutable. Making the valuation even more reliable, such concrete evidence can be independently examined by an outside auditor of the financial statements. Accordingly, under the cost approach, there is paratively little need for judgment and, therefore, little opportunity for blunders or the manipulation of financial results. But that is only one side of the argument. The other is that historical cost, while objectively reliable at the moment a transaction takes place, can bee outdated fairly quickly. That is particularly so for assets 2 that are traded in active markets – such as financial instruments. What is the logic, the fair value adherents assert, of keeping a share of stock on the books at its purchase price when the price has increased or decreased in market trading thereafter? More broadly, insistence upon cost as the ultimate measure of asset value can lead to reported results that make no sense. A FASB member made the point at one meeting through the example of an office building. Under GAAP, the building would be recorded at cost and then, over the succeeding quarters and years, depreciated. The result would be that, for financial reporting purposes, its reported value would go down. At the same time, the economic reality may be that its value was actually increasing. Hence, the ―cost‖ approach would have two results. The first is that the information would be objectively reliable. The second is that it would be pletely wrong. The present d233。tente in this debate is an approach to accounting that seeks to acknowledge the good points made by each side. The approach is to require certain assets to be recorded at fair value and other assets generally to be recorded at cost. Among those assets to be recorded at fair value are certain kinds of financial instruments, the thinking being that financial instruments are often traded in active markets with an observable price. It is hardly an insurmountable challenge, the logic goes, to look up the price each time the financial statements are updated. While that may be true in many or most cases, though, it is not true all the time, and then things start to get a little tricky. FAS 157 acknowledges that there may be instances in which assets will have to be recorded at fair value but in which an observable market price in an active market does not exist. FAS 157 deals with this through the adoption of an approach that focuses attention on the methods used to estimate f