【正文】 ost as the ultimate measure of asset value can lead to reported results that make no sense. A FASB member made the point at one meeting through the example of an office building. Under GAAP, the building would be recorded at cost and then, over the succeeding quarters and years, depreciated. The result would be that, for financial reporting purposes, its reported value would go down. At the same time, the economic reality may be that its value was actually increasing. Hence, the ―cost‖ approach would have two results. The first is that the information would be objectively reliable. The second is that it would be pletely wrong. The present d233。 一張 發(fā)票 或者一合同的存在典 型 地 使支持資產(chǎn)價值 的 證據(jù)變得幾乎不能反駁 。 在這些 以 公允價值 記錄資產(chǎn)中應(yīng)該是 某些種類的金融工具， 原因 是，金融工具 通常 是 在 活躍市場 以一個 可觀察到的價格 交易 。 市場混亂 這改變了今年夏天。 因此，對于那些在財務(wù)報告上帶有責(zé)任的人，當(dāng)時的情況是極其無情的 。但那只是另一種說法，幸福的無知。 fair value。 但是捍衛(wèi)公允價值的人會指出，把財務(wù)資產(chǎn) 以 高于 它們出售價值這一 水平 記錄于賬簿上在 財務(wù)報告 中不是完全透明的模式 。這意味著他們所面臨的是不得不依賴于財務(wù)模型去設(shè)法再創(chuàng)造一個假象銷售情況下的價格并以此作為記錄。仍然 ,該標準似乎是這一棘手的問題的最佳解決方法。第一是信息將客觀可靠。 在談到對資產(chǎn)的合適估價， FAS 157 是對在會計中最古老的爭論之一的最新貢獻者。 這當(dāng)然是 從一個角度 來看待它 。 尤其 是那些 在活躍的市場 上交易的資產(chǎn) 如金融工具。 FAS 157 基本上已建立了一個“公允價值層級”，把所輸入的估計方法通過它們的客觀性和可觀性 區(qū)分優(yōu)先次序 。 CDOs 的問題并沒有令人失望的價值。對次級投資估價的模型很有可能因為未來房價的走勢、利率以及房主能夠如何應(yīng)對這些東西而無法估計。 尤其是美國為了尋求發(fā)展，以詳細的規(guī)則擺脫偏見并融入一個更以原則為基礎(chǔ)的系統(tǒng)。如果財務(wù)報表的編制者和審計人員自以為是誠信的判斷被證實是錯誤時要受到懲罰被普遍認可 ，那么在財務(wù)報表上接下去的進展 —— 至少在美國的高級法院上 —— 可以預(yù)料在程序上將被凍結(jié)。 似乎并不是所有的投資者十分欣賞 ,盡管報告的程度下降提出了數(shù)值模擬和價值 ,從而暗示了水平的精度 ,數(shù)值表現(xiàn)往往意味著 ,是基于財務(wù)模型 的必要依賴一種固有的不可知的未來預(yù)測。 因此，市場開始動蕩了?！毕乱粚邮恰岸壿斎搿保@是輸入“除了包含在一級中可見的資產(chǎn)或負債以外的報價”，比如在市場有相似的資產(chǎn)或負債但并不活躍的報價。一 FASB 的成員在一次會議上通過辦公樓的例子指出了這點。 盡管如此， 我們應(yīng)該 為了解決次級而稍后責(zé)怪會計 師或 要求新的會計標準 。 適用于除其他外，金融工具的排序有關(guān)次級貸款的標準規(guī)定，這些資產(chǎn)將被 以 他們可以出售 的價格來記錄 ，也就是 “價格將在測量日，在一個有秩序的交易市場中以市場參與者之間 出售資產(chǎn)或轉(zhuǎn)移支付的賠償責(zé)任 來確認。 同時 ,經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)實 可能 是它的價值 實際上在 增加 。 通常這將意味著，如果沒有一個活躍的市場， 不得 6 不采用這樣的手段模式： 設(shè)法找出 在假象銷售該資產(chǎn)的情況下，該資產(chǎn)將是什么樣的價格，并以該價格記錄。 就 因為這樣 ， 那些通 常甚至沒有足夠 類似的市場活動 的 CDOs 以二級規(guī)則來作為價值 。據(jù)一位風(fēng)險研究公司的主管所說，“所有這一切波動，我們都寫入報告并進行披露，這絕對是瘋狂的。這在一定程度上取決于我們認可目前的訴訟和監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)對阻礙財務(wù)報告持續(xù)發(fā)展的反省。這很大程度上是 我們 訴訟和監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)的失敗導(dǎo)致那些“騙子”用他們那未被證實的斷言來反對那些 在 當(dāng)時情況下非常艱辛地 盡自己可能 做 事的人。但以前用過的評估方法卻突然不再適用。 兩個 貝爾斯登 基金相繼出現(xiàn)運營問題，這結(jié)果就是增加了金融界對于金融工具 抵押支持債券 的價值的 不確定性，特別是 債務(wù)抵押債券 ，又成為“ CDOs”。 然而 這 在 許多或大多數(shù)情況下 是真實的，雖然并不是在 所有的 時候都是真實的 ，然后 接下來的 事情開始有點棘手 了。 因此，在成本計算法下，相對來說很少需要去判斷，所以，失誤或操縱財務(wù)財務(wù)結(jié)果的機會也就很少。tente in this debate is an approach to accounting that seeks to acknowledge the good points made by each side. The approach is to require certain assets to be recorded at fair value and other assets generally to be recorded at cost. Among those assets to be recorded at fair value are certain kinds of financial instruments, the thinking being that financial instruments are often traded in active markets with an observable price. It is hardly an insurmountable challenge, the logic goes, to look up the price each time the financial statements are updated. While that may be true in many or most cases, though, it is not true all the time, and then things start to get a little tricky. FAS 157 acknowledges that there may be instances in which assets will have to be recorded at fair value but in which an observable market price in an active market does not exist. FAS 157 deals with this through the adoption of an approach that focuses attention on the methods used to estimate fair value. Basically, FAS 157 puts in place a ―fair value hierarchy‖ that prioritizes the inputs to valuation techniques according to their objectivity and observability. At the top are ―Level 1 inputs,‖ which are defined as ―quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to access at the measurement date.‖ Next down in the hierarchy are ―Level 2 inputs,‖ which are inputs ―other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability‖ such as quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in markets that are not active. Lowest on the list are ―Level 3 inputs‖ which are simply ―unobservable,‖ ., there really are no active markets. Under Level 3, inputs are to be ―developed based on the best information available in the circumstances.‖ Often that will mean that, in the absence of an active market, resort will be had to models that seek to figure out what the price to be received in a hypothetical sale of the asset would be. When a draft of FAS 157 was circulated to the financial munity for public ment, not everyone was enthusiastic about its threelevel approach, and thoughtful mentators were understandably concerned about the reliability of hypothetical values that would result from the use of Level 3 inputs. Still, the standard seemed to be the best available resolution to a knotty problem. Some large financial institutions even adopted FAS 157 earlier than required. As they implemented its approach, overall things seemed to go okay. Among those areas where FAS 157 seemed to be working satisfactorily was financial 3 instruments related to subprime loans. MARKET DISLOCATIONS That changed this past summer. We’re all too familiar with what happened. Two Bear Stearns funds ran into problems, and the result was increasing financial munity uncertainty about the value of mortgagebacked financial instruments, particularly collateralized debt obligations or ―CDOs.‖ As investors tried to delve into the details of the value of CDO assets and the reliability of their cash flows, the extraordinary plexity of the instruments provided a significant impediment to insight into the underlying financial data. Financial markets can deal with bad news, but an information vacuum is another thing altogether. The problem with CDOs was not disappointing value. The problem was that the value of the underlying assets could not be figured out. As a result, the markets seized. In other words, everyone got so nervous that active trading of many instruments all but stopped. Largely unnoticed behind th