減少美國(guó)金融系統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)-文庫(kù)吧資料
2024-11-09 05:33本頁(yè)面
【正文】 that control insured depository institutions, bank holding panies, and all subsidiaries of the foregoing. The Dodd proposal is even more strict than Chairman Volcker remended. According to Chairman Volcker it would be acceptable for Goldman Sachs to drop its bank charter and continue to engage in proprietary trading. However, under the Senate draft, Goldman would almost certainly be a systematically important nonbank financial pany when it dropped its bank charter, and thus would continue to be supervised by the Federal Reserve. While Goldman could, as a nonbank, continue to engage in proprietary trading, it would be subject to Federal Reserve controls, including additional capital requirements and additional quantitative limits. Thus, even if Goldman Sachs were to give up its bank charter, it would be required to hold additional capital against its proprietary trading positions. Because institutions that are systemically important are likely to be more thoroughly regulated than those that are not, this could encourage proprietary trading to shift to less carefully monitored firms, thereby increasing systemic risk. Saddling nonbank financial panies engaged in proprietary trading with additional capital requirements is thus problematic. This Article addresses what I regard as the five most important policies for dealing with systemic risk: the imposition of capital requirements (or limits on leverage), the use of clearinghouses and exchanges for overthecounter derivatives, the resolution of insolvent institutions, the emergency lending by the Federal Reserve, and the structure of the regulatory system as it affects the control of systemic risk. II. Capital Requirements Ex ante, regulatory capital requirements have been the chief measure to reduce systemic risk. Capital requirements, which have focused principally on banks, are designed to decrease the likelihood of financial institution failure. If institutions do not fail, the problem of systemic risk largely disappears. Capital requirements have been highly regulated for a long time. Since 1988, the requirements have been standardized worldwide by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision. The United States implemented Basel I and is in the process of implementing Basel II for banks and their holding panies. The SEC had already implemented Pillar I of Basel II for securities firms39。s market share of nondeposit liabilities. As Deputy Treasury Secretary Neal Wolin describes, however, the size limits would not require banks to divest existing operations or restrict anic growth, but would instead limit banks39。s explanation of the government39。s assisted acquisition of Bear Stearns and the injection of federal funds into AIG.(n18) This is one area in which the failure of nonbanks is a major concern, but the severity of this form of systemic risk and the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions is currently unknown.(n19) A report by the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) on the government39。原文 ： The Reduction of Systematic Risk In The United States Financial System Going forward, the central problem for financial regulation (defined as the prescription of rules, as distinct from supervision or risk assessment) is to reduce systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly contribute to the failure
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