【正文】 rise. This may be described as the 39。 reasoning was based on the general principle which makes the acplice39。s car but also for criminal damage to property or perhaps arson. Or, worse yet, if a firefighter or building occupant dies in the fire, it might even be asserted that X is liable for manslaughter. Members of the academic munity, including Professors Wayne La Fave, Joshua Dressier, and Audrey Rogers, have strongly criticized the Category III approach because it holds an individual to the same culpability as a principal for a crime the mission of which the acplice had no knowledge of or intent to 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 4 assist in. Scholars have also asserted that this foreseeableoffense extension of the plicity doctrine is clearly a minority view. In any event, under this view one is held accountable for the incidental crime as a result of choosing to enter into the criminal arena, an environment where history has shown criminality has a tendency to spread like fast growing cancer cells. The goal of this Article is to examine the legislation and case law concerning acplice liability at the state level in order to assess the extent to which individual states follow one approach over another regarding the required mental state for criminal accountability. Part IT focuses exclusively on the various acplice liability statutes that appear at the state level. It points out language that monly appears describing the actus rea and mens rea requirements and terminology which may be unique to a particular state jurisdiction. Part IT also explores related statutory provisions, such as whether a state has a codified defense of withdrawal or an exception for the victim or incidental party. Part 1I1 explores the case law in those states that follow, or rather flirt with, the narrow Category I approach. Part IV examines those states that follow, by statute or judicial interpretation, either one of the two subcategories of the Category 11, or statutorily prescribed, approach. FROM:JOHN F. DECKER MENTAL ELEMENT IN COMPLICITY The House of Lords39。s battery of C. In the example where X gives her keys to the intoxicated Y (which itself is a violation of the state39。s arming B while knowing of B39。s barking dog with A39。 States 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 3 that do not distinguish between conduct and resultoriented crimes will hold an individual liable for the conduct of another as long as the individual possessed the statutorily prescribed mental state for the substantive crime.39。 the injury in battery). However, if the crime focuses on the conduct of the actor rather than the result (., the unauthorized entry in burglary。s intent to shoot the neighbor39。s dog be shot. Likewise, if X gives the keys of her car to Y, who is intoxicated, knowing Y 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 2 intends to drive the car, X would not be criminally liable if Ys reckless driving kills or injures an innocent person. Thus, this might simply be described as the specific intent approach. The second approach, is what might be called the statutorily prescribed mental state approach. According to this somewhat more expansive view, an individual may be liable for a crime the individual did not specifically intend for the perpetrator to mit. Rather, liability attaches if the alleged acplice acted with the mental culpability required for the mission of the offense. Thus, states following this approach will hold an individual liable for the conduct of another if that individual possessed the mental state prescribed by the state39。s act unless he himself intends that B39。s criminality, the acplice is liable even if the substantive crime only requires recklessness or negligence on the part of the principal. Thus, if A loans his gun to B knowing B intends to use it to shoot his neighbor39。s liability turns on whether the acplice harbored the mental state required of the substantive crime allegedly aided or abetted. The first approach, asserts that an individual should only be liable for the acts of a principal if that individual acted with the specific intent to promote or assist the principal39。s purpose [was] to encourage or assist another in the mission of a crime.39。 acplice laws present a confused picture in terms of the law39。蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 1 THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW Due to the inconsistency between the plain language of states