【正文】 gnored until cure was impossible. Then, able no longer even to eat, they soon died. Scabies, tropical skin ulcers, eye infections, tuberculosis, and venereal disease were also mon. During the fighting in the southwest in 1945, American observers found that the 13th Army was unable to hike even a short distance without men falling out wholesale and many dying from utter Starvation. Another American officer, Colonel David D. Barrett, reported seeing Nationalist soldiers ‘topple over and die after marching less than a mile. A reporter for the highly regarded Takungpao (‘L’Impartial’) observed that’ where troops have passed, dead soldiers can be found by the roadside one after another’. Units of the Nationalist army that were especially favoured or were trained by the United States— such as the Youth Army and 6 the Chinese Expeditionary Forces trained in India— continued to be well fed and equipped. But they were exceptions. There did exist an Army Medical Corps, but the medical treatment it provided was described by Dr Robert Lim (Lin K’osheng), chairman of the Chinese Red Cross medical Relief Corps, as ‘preNightingale. The formal structure of the medical corps— prising firstaid teams, dressing stations, field hospitals and base hospitals— was unexceptionable, but it was undermined by inadequate and inpetent personnel, insufficient equipment and medicines, corruption and callousness. There were only some 2021 reasonably qualified doctors serving in the entire army— a ratio at best of about one qualified doctor for every 1700 men, pared to about one doctor for every 150 men in the United States Army. An additional 28000 medical officers served in the corps, but most of these had received no formal training, and had simply been promoted from stretcherbearers, to dressers, to ‘doctors’. The few really petent doctors tended to congregate in reararea hospitals, out of reach of seriously wounded soldiers in the front lines. Because the stretcher units were often understaffed, and medical transport scarce, a wound in bat — even a minor wound — was often fatal. It could be a day before a wounded soldier received even preliminary first aid. Then he had to be hauled to dressing stations and hospitals in the rear. Rhodes Farmer, who saw wounded being transported to the rear in 1938, observed that gangrene was everywhere: maggots writhed in the wounds. With this kind o f treatment, even minor wounds quickly became infected, and major injuries, such as a wound in the stomach or loss of a limb, were usually fatal. Few cripples were seen in wartime China. The Chinese soldier, ill fed, abused and scorned, inevitably lacked morale. This was indicated graphically by wholesale desertions. Most recruits, if they survived the march to their assigned units, had few thoughts other than to escape. Many succeeded. The 18th Division of the 18th Army, for example, was regarded as one of the better units, yet during 1942, stationed in the rear and not engaged in bat, 6000 of its 11,000 men disappeared due to death or desertion. Ambassador Gauss mented that these statistics were not exceptional, and that similar attrition rates prevailed in all the military districts. Even the elite forces of Hu Tsungnan— which, because they were used to contain the Communist forces in the north, were among the best trained, fed, and equipped soldiers in the army reportedly required replacements in 1943 at the rate of 600 men per division of 10000 men every month. Official statistics lead to the conclusion that over eight million men, about one of every two soldiers, were unaccounted for and presumably either deserted or died from other than battlerelated causes. FROM:John ,The Cambridge History of China:Republican China,19121949[M],Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986. 1939— 1945年的惡化：軍事 費正清 1938年 10月下旬武漢和廣州失陷后，戰(zhàn)爭的特征和國民黨區(qū)域的狀況起了深刻的變化。 fifteen defected in 1942。 and 43000 in 1943. Yet the battle lines from 1939 to early 1944 were not significantly altered, and the strategic balance between the two enemies was little changed for nearly six years. The Nationalist army during the latter half of the war numbered more than 3500000 men. It was not, however, a united, national army, but a coalition of armies which differed in degrees of loyalty to the central government as well as in training, equipment, and military capabilities. At the heart of this heterogeneous assemblage was the ‘Central Army’ (Chungyangchun). In 1941, it prised some thirty divisions (about 300000 men) out of a total of over 300 divisions in the entire Nationalist army. As the war progressed, Chiang added to this force so that, by the end of the war, the Central Army counted about 650000 men. Officers in the Central Army in 1937 were typically graduates of the Central Military Academy. There they had received an introduction to modern military techniques, often during the 1930s from German instructors. Political indoctrination had bulked large in their training。 and tha t [they] can sit back, holding what they have against the Japanese, and concentrate their planning upon China’s postwar political and economic problems. The chief political problem that distracted the Nationalists’ attention from the Japanese was the growing friction with the Chinese Communists. After the New Fourth Army incident in January 1941 (seep. 665) the united front had virtually ceased to exist. Influential Nationalist leaders — most notably the minister of war, Ho Yingch’in, and the party apparatchik, Ch’en Lifuat various times stridently advocated a final extermination campaign against the Communists. Chiang Kaishek resisted these pressures, in large part because he feared that the Allies would cease aiding the Nationalist army if it became openly involved in civil war. Yet, since mid1