倫敦經(jīng)濟學院高微講義-一般均衡(參考版)
2024-10-21 11:17本頁面
【正文】 [xa+Ra] (G) Bill xb (A) Ben Rb (D) 2Ra + Rb The coalition ? Feasible How the blocking coalition works A B D ? Can this allocation be blocked? An Aperson would be better off somewhere here Bing ! What if there were 500 of each type...? 500 of the A tribe 450 of the B tribe ? 500 of the A tribe 400 ? 500 of the A tribe 360 ? 500 of the A tribe 310 i ? 500 of the A tribe 250 i ? If N is bigger there may be more blocking coalitions A B D ? E The only allocation left in the 2Nperson core (eventually)... ? As you clone the economy the core bees smaller. ? In the limit it contains only petitive equilibrium allocations. ? But notice that this requires balanced replication of the Alf and Bill tribes ? And it assumes that all these various coalitions are somehow relevant A powerful result: the shrinking core ?Endowments ?Preferences ?Allocations ?Coalitions ?Blocking Answer to question: why pricetaking? ?In a large economy with suitably small agents... ?....it39。 Ben ? D Alf, Arthur, Ben Bill ? G ...leaving the Ben twin outside the coalition This allocation is not a solution... But it shows that the core has bee smaller No. {AlfArthurBill} can block A... Alf 189。 Arthur Bill 39。 Ben Alf 39。 Arthur Bill 39。Bill} ... plus some new ones All the old coalitions are poss
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