【正文】 World Economy / 1 – 19, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2021 1 Introduction The phenomenal performance of China constitutes the great economic miracle of the last quarter century. China’s economy has expanded by leaps and bounds, at historically unprecedented rates that few economists would have found plausible or feasible exante. More importantly, this growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people from deep poverty and has helped improve health, education and other social standards. China has acplished all this using its own brand of experimental gradualism: increasingly relying on markets and on price signals, yet until very recently doing so within the boundaries of a highly unorthodox set of institutions. That trade has played a significant role in this transformation is beyond dispute. China would likely have grown even if the global economy had been closed. The very early stages of Chinese growth, based on rural reform, did not in any significant way rely on global markets. However, from the mid1980s on, one must suppose that China’s growth was fueled and sustained by the opportunities that the world market offered. We can see the increasing footprint of foreign trade and investment in all the major aggregates. The share of exports in GDP rose from virtually nothing in the 1960s to close to 30 percent in 2021, a rate of increase that ismuch larger than what has been experienced elsewhere in the world . Inward direct foreign investment has risen from close to zero in the early 1980s to approximately 5 percent of GDP. The flip side of these figures is that China has bee one of the world’s biggest trading powers, accounting for 6 percent of global trade flows. The Indeterminacy of Comparative Advantage Consider how a country’s pattern of specialization and trade is determined. The principle of parative advantage dictates that trade patterns are determined by how relative costs of production within a country differ from those in the rest of the world. These differences are in turn linked to differences in productivity levels across industries (as in the Ricardian model of trade) or to differences in relative factor endowments across countries (as in the Heckscher–Ohlin model). In these models, entrepreneurs observe costs directly and make their investment decisions accordingly. However, in a poor developing country, investors contemplating entry into new, nontraditional activities face considerable uncertainty about the costs of operation. These costs will likely depend not just on factor endowments, but also on the investor’s success with technology adoption and adaptation, on the policy environment, and (perhaps also) on the number of other investors making similar investment choices. The risks that arise from such uncertainty are borne disproportionately by early entrants into new industries, who therefore provide valuable informational spillovers to the rest of the economy. If they are successful, later entrants can observe the profitability of the incumbents and emulate them. If they fail, they pay the full cost of their failure. This externality implies that market forces on their own generate too little investments in new activities。黃和丹尼 ?羅德里克 , ,”美國國家經(jīng)濟研究局工作論文 ,國家經(jīng)濟研究局 . [3]庫讓 , ,巴里諾頓 . [4]Kraemer,肯尼斯 ?l .和 Jason Dedrick, :20世紀 90 年代中國的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策和成果 ,加州大學歐文分校 ,信息技術(shù)研究中心和組織 . [5]拉迪 ,2021.“中國 :偉大的新經(jīng)濟挑戰(zhàn) ,國際經(jīng)濟研究所 ,華盛 頓特區(qū) . [6],Dic 和托馬斯 ,陳 ,1998 年 .中國機械的對外貿(mào)易和經(jīng)濟增長的關系 ,國際發(fā)展雜志 ,第 10卷 ,6 號 733 49 頁 . [7]阿德里安 注意，我們使用 1999 年至 2021 年的 PRODY 平均值構(gòu)造 EXPY 指數(shù)，以便于構(gòu)建的 EXPY 指數(shù)也不會隨年份的變化而有所不同 。每年發(fā)布貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)的國家數(shù)目都有很大差異，而我