諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)經(jīng)典理論—納什均衡的ppt詳解(ppt31)-經(jīng)濟(jì)理論(參考版)
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【正文】 ( * * ) 0v G G v G c? ? ?* * *GG?2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information ? Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information ? Theory: Backward Induction Example: The Trust Game General features: (1) Player 1 chooses an action from the feasible set . (2) Player 2 observes and then chooses an action from the feasible set . (3) Payoffs are and . 1a 1A1a 2a2A1 1 2( , )u a a 2 1 2( , )u a aCont’d Backward Induction: Then “People think backwards” 2 2 1 2a r g m a x ( , )a u a a?1 1 1 2 1a r g m a x ( , ( ) )a u a R a? An example: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly Two firms quantity pete sequentially. Timing: (1) Firm 1 chooses a quantity 。( ) 0i i i i iv g g g v g g c??? ? ? ? ?* * * * *1 1 1... ...i i i ng g g g g? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?n n*1( * ) 39。39。 , . . . , }nnG S S u u?n iS i Applications Cournot Model Two firms A and B quantity pete. Inverse demand function They have the same constant marginal cost, and there is no fixed cost. ,0P a Q a? ? ?Cont’d Firm A’s problem: 22()20220A A A A B A AAABABAAAPq c q a q q q c qda q q cdqa q cqddq? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ?????? ? ?Cont’d By symmetry, firm B’s problem. Figure Illustration: Response Function, Tatonnement Process Exercise: what will happens if there are n identical Cournot peting firms? (Convergence to Competitive Equilibrium) The problem of Commons David Hume (1739): if people respond only to private incentives, public goods will be underprovided and public resources overutilized. Hardin(1968) : The Tragedy of Commons Cont’d There are farmers in a village. They all graze their goat on the village green. Denote the number of goats the farmer owns by , and the total number of goats in the village b
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