【正文】 objectives. They choose organizational arrangements tha t minimi challenge in conducting an performance based make or buy study is to account for endogeneity in subcontracting decisions. The panel data structures provides controls. This study of contractual inpleteness falls into the class of empirical work that considers uncertainty and plexity of a transaction. Seminal contributions include Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984) and Masten et al. (1991). They nd a higher degree of plexity is associated with a lower probability of subcontracting. Recent work by Gil (2020) (movies), Acemoglu,Aghion, Grith, and Zilibotti (2020) (Ramp。s speci cations list construction work items and corresponding quantities. On bridge contracts, tasks range from heavy engineering jobs such as installing structural concrete, steel, asphalt, and drilling to ancillary tasks such as trac striping, fencing, and landscaping. For each task, bidders decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor. They also submit a unit price bid expressed as dollars per unit of quantity. Unit price bids are aggregated according to a scoring rule to determine the low bidder. Inpleteness is inherently a di cult concept to measure. A measurement should capture contractors39。 bids submitted exante, not costs incurred expost, establish the terms of pensation. Primary contractors, who submit bids, and the subcontractors they hire are liable for all costs. Consequently, forward looking, rational contractors will assess the likelihood that design changes will occur and incorporate anticipated adaptation costs into their bids. I develop a model representation of the designbidbuild process and propose a 11 measure of contractual inpleteness to address four quantitative questions. What is the eect of inpleteness on cost if a subcontractor performs work? What is the e ect if a primary contractor performs work?Do these eects dier? Finally, what are the dollarvalued magnitudes? The baseline prediction is that cost increases in the degree of inpleteness under both arrangements, but with a larger marginal eect for work performed by a subcontractor. I apply the framework to bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). A vast body of empirical work qualitatively analyzes how rms are organized. These traditional studies, lacking cost measures, only address the third question listed above: does inpleteness(or some other parameter) a ect the probability of subcontracting? There is very little quantitativeevidence about the impact of rm boundaries on economic outes such as cost. This has been a major critique in this literature (Hubbard, 2020。s notorious Big Dig which required drastic changes in construction plans. Construction projects begin with the preparation of plans, specications, and blueprints. For reasons largely unpredictable and out of the control of both buyers and contractors, modications and revisions will be changes require contractors and their subcontractors to adapt the construction process without direction from a prior written contract. This is the sense in which construction contracts are inplete. According to inplete contracting theories of therm(Coase, 1937。在招標的優(yōu)點是無偏見的獎勵的計劃 ,它沒有反映優(yōu)化 ,事后的適應(yīng)。 我們繼續(xù)認為付款程序的選擇 ,如固定價格成本加成合同 ,是與后續(xù)的決定綁在一個 procurer 面 :不管授予競爭性招標采購合同或通過談判的潛在的供應(yīng)商。 為我們的直覺處方源于緊張關(guān)系提供獎勵降低成本 ,避免昂貴和浪費 ,暨南請求之后變化。在這一章我們認為合同的形式和獎勵機制可以剪裁的幫助緩解這個采購問題。這些問題很難預(yù)測 ,都 procurer 和 承包商。例如，承包商“刺痛了一個滑” ,竟然搬到 75000 立方公尺的地球。這些改變通常是由于設(shè)計失敗、不可預(yù)見的條件 ,和改變監(jiān)管要求。特別是 ,它試圖當競爭投標揭示與固定造價合同將被優(yōu)先考慮談判成本加成合同 ,什么時候不該吃。這些特點 ,以及贊成平等機會 ,提供正當?shù)穆衫缏?lián)邦的習得條例》 (美國聯(lián)邦航空 局法規(guī) ),強烈支持使用在美國的競爭投標公共部門 . 有趣的是 ,有普遍使用的兩個競爭投標和談判在私營部門。此外 ,面對競爭的每個人都有許多潛在的供應(yīng)商他不充氣的強烈沖動的價格。最后 ,這個獎項機制會導(dǎo)致一個合格的選擇和理想供應(yīng)商和在實施一個有效的最終產(chǎn)品。 當考慮采購的貨物和服務(wù)時 ,采購者面臨許多挑戰(zhàn)。專業(yè)經(jīng)濟學(xué)家的主要焦點已經(jīng)在公共部 門的采購，部分是由于它對于經(jīng)濟有純粹的重要性。 1 引言 制成品，如電腦，電視和汽車的大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)，他們有標準化的特點，通常按價格表購買。分析表明對于使用競爭性招標有大量可能性的限制。當項目是復(fù)雜的時候，這些可能會執(zhí)行不佳，合同的設(shè)計也不完整，很少有可用的競投者。其他商品，比如新的建筑，戰(zhàn)斗機，定制軟件或咨詢服務(wù)定制是針對采購人的具體要求購買，他們通常有特殊的需要。 1 例如，在美國，聯(lián)邦，州和當?shù)卣牟少徴紘鴥?nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分之十幾。首先 ,她必須選擇究竟什么應(yīng)該被采購，怎樣傳遞需要到潛在的新供應(yīng)商。 隨后這兩場分 ,競爭投標是被廣泛認可一個有吸引力的采購機制和普遍提倡 7 這有幾個原因。事實上 ,公平市場價格發(fā)現(xiàn)是經(jīng)常吹捧為一種有益的由于這樣的招標。舉例來說 ,從1995 年到 2020 年 ,百分之四十四的私人建筑施工項目的棚舍在加利福尼亞州北部被發(fā)現(xiàn)利用談判 ,而只有百分之十八的人收購利用開放的競爭招標。 把這一章 ,是值得觀察 角度 ,大部分的經(jīng)濟分析采購問題描述如下。 一個數(shù)值例子的意義是事后適應(yīng)的建筑蓋蒂中心在洛杉磯藝術(shù)博物館 ,這是一個 24 畝 ,設(shè)施 ,10 億美元接管了 8 年的構(gòu)裝體 (請參閱《工程技術(shù) NewRecord 199 199 )。更多的嚴重的 ,在 1994 年一場地震。然而 ,似乎合理的 ,一旦問題的出現(xiàn) ,承包商具有優(yōu)良的相關(guān)信息成本和實施辦法的變化。特別是 ,一個激勵之間的協(xié)調(diào)為了降低成本和鼓勵促進變化和分享信息將鑰匙部隊在 爭論合同的選擇。強烈的刺激 ,以降低成本提供固定轉(zhuǎn)化合同將導(dǎo)致雙方 交易的時候再剩余價值要改審議。而我們的研究實踐的對話已經(jīng)激發(fā)了私營機構(gòu) ,它提供了公共部門的意義。這表明公共采購復(fù)雜的項目是遭受效率損失我們開始我們的分析在下一節(jié)里與一個簡單的框架來描述采購者選擇設(shè)計 ,采購合同管理的關(guān)系用選定的供應(yīng)商。 Williamson, 1985)frictions in the bargaining and renegotiation process that acpanies a contract change generate expost adaptation costs. Theory predicts these costs are higher when the process involves subcontractors. These cost considerations in uence contractors39。 Lafontaine and Slade, 2020。 beliefs about the noncontracted contingencies that might occur during the expost build phase. Many contingencies alter blueprints, which, in turn, requires an adjustment in quantities actually installed. I propose a measure based on quantity changes. Specically, the dierence between the work item quantity in the original blueprints and the quantity actually installed after blueprint revisions proxies for inpleteness. Those tasks that experience little or no change were likely perceived by contractors to have a low degree of inpleteness while those with large changes a high degree of inpleteness. This is an exogenous measure because