【導(dǎo)讀】上這是一種變相的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義。本文從碳關(guān)稅出臺的背景出發(fā)，提出了碳關(guān)。稅的概念，碳關(guān)稅是對進(jìn)口到本國的外國高能耗產(chǎn)品征收的環(huán)境稅。由于該措施將直接影響進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品的價格，故須符合WTO. 進(jìn)而重點(diǎn)通過對碳關(guān)稅與WTO規(guī)則分析，分別針對最惠國待遇。一深入分析，再結(jié)合一些國內(nèi)外專家學(xué)者對碳關(guān)稅與WTO規(guī)則分析的觀點(diǎn)，最后針對這一系列問題和我國經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境現(xiàn)狀，提出了我國應(yīng)對“碳。關(guān)稅”壁壘的對策。定者，維護(hù)國家正當(dāng)權(quán)益。另一方面，要加快發(fā)展新能源和新材料產(chǎn)業(yè)，加快。行國際減排義務(wù)，共同實(shí)現(xiàn)全球減排目標(biāo)，為全球?qū)崿F(xiàn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展做出貢獻(xiàn)。師的指導(dǎo)下進(jìn)行的研究工作及取得的成果。盡我所知，除文中特別。或?qū)W歷而使用過的材料?；蚣w，均已在文中作了明確的說明并表示了謝意。

　　

【正文】 e developed countries. The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime. 17 There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to e by. But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time. This is because the outes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade. Global production volumes continued to rise after 1994 when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began, with signs of tapering off only in 20xx and 20xx. As is widely known, this increase in production occurred in the developed countries as well. Not surprisingly, therefore, the volume of world trade continued to rise as well after 1994 . The real shift occurred in agricultural prices which, after some buoyancy between 1993 and 1995, have declined thereafter, and particularly sharply after 1997. It is this decline in unit values that resulted in a situation where the value of world trade stagnated and then declined after 1995, when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began. There was a sharp fall in the rate of growth of global agricultural trade between the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, with the decline in growth in the 1990s being due to the particularly poor performance during the 1998 to 20xx period. Price declines and stagnation in agricultural trade values in the wake of the UR Agreement on Agriculture were acpanied and partly influenced by the persisting regionalisation of world agricultural trade. The foci of such regionalisation were Western Europe and Asia, with 32 and 11 per cent of global agricultural trade being intraWestern European and intraAsian trade respectively. What is noteworthy, however, is that agricultural exports 18 accounted for a much higher share of both merchandise and primary products trade in North America and Western Europe (besides Latin America and Africa) than it did for Asia. Thus, despite being the developed regions of the world, agricultural production and exports were important influences on the economic performance of North America and Western Europe. It is, therefore, not surprising that Europe is keen on maintaining its agricultural sector through protection, while the US is keen on expanding its role in world agricultural markets by subsidising its own farmers and forcing other countries to open up their markets. The problem is that the US has been more successful in prising open developing country markets than the large EU market. Thus, out of $104 billion worth of exports from North America in 20xx, $34 billion went to Asia and $15 billion to Latin America, whereas exports to Europe amounted to $14 billion. The Cairns group of exporting countries (Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay), for some of whom at least agricultural exports are extremely important, want world market to be freed of protection as well as the surpluses that result from huge domestic support in the US and the EC. We must note that $35 billion of the $63 billion of exports from Latin America went to the US and the EU. More open markets and less domestic support in those destinations is, therefore, crucial for the region. The fact that Europe has been successful in its effort at retaining its agricultural space with the help of a Common Agricultural Policy that both supports and subsidises its agricultural producers is clear , which shows that intraEC trade which accounted for 74 per cent of EU exports in 1990, continued to account for 73 per cent of total EU exports in 1995 and 20xx. Mr Fischler reportedly declared that the March 31 deadline set at Doha was for the chairman of the agricultural negotiating group to present his proposal for 19 modalities and that did not mean automatically that the next day all members of the WTO will agree to that proposal. In any case, with discussions on the reform of the EU39。s Common Agricultural Policy expected to continue well into the summer, the EC does not yet have a fully formulated position to adopt in the course of the negotiations. Thus, the March 31 deadline cannot be met. Till such time as these issues are cleared it is not at all certain that an agreement on agriculture, which is a prerequisite for the launch and pletion of the `Doha Round39。 of trade negotiations, can be ensured by 20xx. That is, the EU wants the right to openly and transparently support and protect its farmers, and wants adequate elbowroom within the agreement to do so. But the fact that it is unwilling to go the US way, by opting for less transparent support measures that have been defined as acceptable helps those who paint it as the stumbling block on the road to free trade. The reason for the peculiar situation is that through the manoeuvres made during the Uruguay Round, especially the famous Blair House accord, the rich nations managed to obtain Cairns group concurrence and developing country support for an agreement that pro