【正文】 。感謝VB交流群得朋友。感謝論文引用的文獻(xiàn)作者。感謝一切幫助過我的人。感謝501寢室陪我度過了4年得美好時光。外文資料原文外文資料原文THE RADAR WARNING STORYCharlesIN THE BEGINNING YEAR: 1965In July 1965, an American F4 Phantom II was shot down over North loss represented the first American aircraft to be downed by an SA2 SurfacetoAirMissile (SAM) in the Southeast Asian conflict. This event heralded the beginning of a serious and lethal new challenge to American air superiority.In the succeeding months of the war, American aircraft would attempt to penetrate major targets in the North, and they would fly their missions into the teeth of the most sophisticated air defense network ever deployed in history.The North Vietnam air defense system, as it evolved in the mid to late 1960s, consisted of AntiAircraft Artillery (AAA), SAMs and MIG fighter aircraft, all closely coordinated through the use of munications and radar. The need to counter this lethal new threat was painfully obvious as losses of aircraft and crew grew to unacceptable levels.Brigadier General . Dempster,then Director of Operational Requirements and Development Plans, . Air Force Headquarters, was selected to head a Blue Ribbon Air Staff Task Force to investigate methods of countering these lethal weapon systems in an effort to provide warning and protection to . air crews against this new threat.The need for aircraft selfprotection assets was the driving force behind a seminar held in August 1965, and led to a remendation for the development of aircraft avionics systems capable of detecting and destroying the controlling radars in these defense networks. The concept was appropriately named Wild Weasel, an animal known to hunt vermin.Almost in disastrous parallel, a Navy RA5C reconnaissance aircraft was lost over Dienbienphu. Again, the culprit was the $ million aircraft was lost, causing considerable ment that the aircraft was too expensive to introduce into bat. Sovietbuilt SAM technology was threatening to destroy a much needed intelligence capability that had been developed and deployed at a cost of several hundred million dollars.In parallel with the Dempster panel, DDRamp。E convened a mittee to evaluate options and make selections for the development of a warning and jamming equipment suite. It was decided that of all the proposals received, a concept called Vector IV offered the best potential solution to the warning problem. As a result of this decision, a thensmall pany based in Northern California rocketed into national focus. The Vector IV concept was proposed by Applied Technology, Inc.In November 1965, the USAF Sacramento Air Material Area awarded Applied Technology a contract for 500 AN/APR25s, the system nomenclature for the Vector IV concept. The system was based on the use of crystalvideo detection techniques in the threat bands only, where the hostile equipment’s relative direction was resolved by a CRT display using vectorial inputs from four antenna patterns. Thus, the initial concept name, Vector IV.Until this time, Applied Technology had been primarily involved in strategic reconnaissance and intelligence technology programs where a large production run consisted of 10 systems. The impact of the AN/APR25 award was huge. Further, the . Navy awarded Applied Technology a production order to outfit its aircraft with this critical new protective asset.Very little was known about the threat in those early days, and the design philosophies of warning systems were based upon gathering as much signal information as available. Later this philosophy would change as the need for sorting analysis and prioritization of lethal pulses became semiautomatic。On a Friday the 13th in 1966, Applied Technology’s AN/APR26 radar warning receiver performed successfully in a bat mission and added yet another success for the growing pany. In the 1966 – 1967 time frame, Applied Technology was shipping radar homing and warning systems at a rate of 250 per month. Employment levels approached 1,400, a sevenfold increase in just two years.The AN/APR36 and AN/APR37 were updates to . Air Force AN/APR25/26 systems. Continually pressing the edge of technology for new ways to protect aircraft and crews, Applied Technology developed and added features such as automatic time/video correlation circuits. At the same time, the pany developed a superheterodyne analysis receiver in the form of the AN/APR35 system.This second generation system was quickly fitted into all Wild Weasel aircraft. The new equipment provided the Electronic Warfare Operators (EWO) with improved capability to discretely assess the threat.It was during their support of strike missions into North Vietnam that the Wild Weasels won their motto of “first in and last out.” The Weasels flew well in advance of strike aircraft and actually baited hostile SAMs to clear a safe corridor for the follower aircraft to enter and reach the target. The Weasels rolled back the SAM sites through bait or attack of the sites. As they detected SAMs along the strike route, they also provided warning to strike aircraft when they detected a SAM launch. This provided an instant alert and maximum reaction time for evasive action. . Air Force B52s were never sent into North Vietnam, or any other areas within possible range of SAMs, without a Wild Weasel escort.New technology had been deployed at the scene of the battle, and the use of Applied Technology’s radar homing and warning equipment played a key role in the success of the engagements.The action taken to interface this new technology with needs of a pilot and an EWO required unprecedented military and industry teamwork. Tense pilots, busy flying their aircraft with full knowledge of their illumination by a SAM, did not have the time to work with a potentiometer or a confusing jumble of strobes. The action to address this issue was is one of the most critical successes of the Wild Weasel program. Teamwork between the pilot and EWO d