公司金融作業(yè)一-資料下載頁
2025-03-27 00:50本頁面
【正文】 DO): in which no shareholder owns over 5% shares of the firmThe important thing is protecting investors from managerial entrenchment and expropriation. The principal mechanisms that limit the typeⅠ agency cost are control contestability from the market for corporate control and the market for professional managers.A wellfunctioning takeover market subjects firms to a continuous auction process. In principal, firms should therefore be ultimately owned and managed by those who maximize their value (Jensen amp。 Ruback, 1983).(2)Controlled Structure (CS): in which a large blockholder owns a majority of firm’s sharesSo, there is little room for control contestability. The problem bees the expropriation of small investors by large controlling shareholders. The principle mechanism that limits this type Ⅱ agency cost is the alignment effect, ing from the same interest between the controller and the small investors.(3)ControllingMinority Structure (CMS): in which a shareholder exercise control while retaining only a small fraction of the equity claims on a firm’s cash flow The controller holds the control rights (voting rights), which insulates him from the market for corporate control.The controller only owns a small fraction of the firm’s cash flow rights, which weakens the alignment effect between the controller and the minority shareholders.Thus, the CMS threatens to bine the incentive problems associated with both the CS and the DO ownership in a single ownership structure. 分析要求： （1）DO模式中，發(fā)達(dá)的證券市場如何能夠?qū)ζ髽I(yè)經(jīng)營者產(chǎn)生治理作用？（2）解釋typeⅠ agency cost和 type Ⅱ agency cost。
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