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財務(wù)管理中的風(fēng)險分析外文文獻(xiàn)--英文-外文文獻(xiàn)-資料下載頁

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【導(dǎo)讀】arenowsuffering.reformin. sstate-ownedenterprises?(SOEs)reform.

  

【正文】 mpirical, micro and practical world. Further conclusions will be generated after data collection and analysis. However, I have some hypotheses that will be tested as final conclusion. Independent director has negative relationship with account receivable. IT: Minority shareholders’ participation has negative relationship with account mainly consider the balance effect of independent director, minority shareholder to ultimate controlled enterprise will have higher assetreliability ratio. Pyramid structure corporation will have lower assetreliability consider the relationship between structure of shareholder and assetreliability ’s participation in corporation’s operation will facilitate scientific finance and investment decision of information disclosure will facilitate scientific finance and investment consider the impact of stakeholder on finance and investment are several conclusion examples. More hypotheses could be made based on our investigation and experience after launching this project. In the end, further research providing empirical evidence of best practice in corporate governance and risk management is needed. There is too little evidence to support many of the generally accepted tes of corporate governance. These tes should be questioned in an open and constructive manner and more evidence need to be sought to justify, improve or refute them. Ⅴ . References [1] Bai, Chongen, Qiao Liu, and Joe Lu, Frank Song, and Junxi Zhang, 2021, “Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China”, working paper, CCFR, University of Hong Kong. [2] Berglof, Eric and ErnstLudwig von Thadden. 1999. “The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implication for Transition and Development Countries”. Working Paper, Stockholm School of Economics. [3] Berle, A., amp。 Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Harcourt, Brace amp。World (Rev. ed.). 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[11] Eduardus Tandelilin, Hermeindito Kaaro, Putu Anom Mahadwartha, Supriyatna, 2021, Corporate Governance, Risk Management, and Bank Performance: Does Type of Ownership Matter? Eadn Working Paper No. 34 (2021) [12] Froot, Kenh, David Scharfstein, and Jeremy Stein, 1993, Risk management: Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies, The Journal of Finance 48, 16291658. [13] Gees Dionne and Thouraya Triki,2021, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Importance of Independence and Financial Knowledge for the Board and the Audit Committee. Working paper 0503 (2021) [14] Gees Dionne and Thouraya Triki,2021, On Risk Management Determinants: What Really Matters? Working paper 0404 (2021) [15] Hart, Oliver. 1995. “ Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications”. The Economic Journal, vol. 105, issue 430, May 1995. 678689. 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