【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 t other creditor ?rms whose troubles snowball and drive other ?rms into ef?cacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does regulators do not step in to bail out an individual ?rm, the alternative is to let it the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the ?rmare very quickly contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 ?ling of a non?nancial , if the nonbank ?nancial ?rm in question has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation(SIPC), the ?rmis required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act(SIPA)to liquidate under Chapter 7(Don and Wang, 1990).This explains in large partwhy only the holding pany of Lehman ?led for bankruptcy in 2008 and its broker–dealer subsidiaries were not part of the Chapter 11 major fear of a ?nancial ?rm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that ?re sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed ?nancial ?rm and that these ?re saleswill have rami?cations for other ?rms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed ?rm(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).This fear was behind the Fed’s decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 – Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on ?nancial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid have resulted in...[a] ?re sale scenario..., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse ?nancial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia)The fear of potential ?re sales is expressed in further detail in the same speech as a reason for the merger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear...would be forced to ?le for bankruptcy...[which] would have forced Bear’s secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained they responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured ?nancing to other ?rms, a much broader liquidity crisis would have ensued.”The idea that creditors of a failed ?rm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic tenets of laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in no way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly actually reduces the likelihood of ?re sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy ?ling does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a pressure to pay debts, the ?rm can remain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of , a major plaint about the is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the , however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest, then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick occurred in the case of Lehman’s asset sale to Barclays, which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold 2008年秋，當(dāng)美聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)和財(cái)政部拒絕85億美金巨資保險(xiǎn)投入到美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)時(shí)，這邊借給美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的貨款就直接落到了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手手里，而投保人只得到極少的一部分資金。在那些大的受益人當(dāng)中，高盛用12億美金來(lái)撤銷(xiāo)美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的信用違約互換。這一應(yīng)急方案通過(guò)逐步售出美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的資產(chǎn)來(lái)償還貸款，而不是保住崗位或者是確保短期貸款市場(chǎng)像之前那樣持續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)效能。因此，政府避免美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的，是為了確保美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的商業(yè)伙伴不至于破產(chǎn)。從這一出發(fā)點(diǎn)，很明顯是信用違約互換當(dāng)中最好的一個(gè)。也是因?yàn)檫@一點(diǎn)，相比2008年美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)多贏得4000億的合同。在條款當(dāng)中，美國(guó)政府在援助通用汽車(chē)時(shí)表現(xiàn)的并沒(méi)那么積極，可能是因?yàn)檎_信，通用的破產(chǎn)把損失強(qiáng)加到相關(guān)的合作企業(yè)，這樣不會(huì)對(duì)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生太大的壞影響。這一決定和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)查的結(jié)果是一致的，即金融公司的破產(chǎn)比非金融公司的破產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大很多。例如Bordo和 Haubrich提到“越是嚴(yán)重的金融事件越是和嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退聯(lián)系在一起。”同樣的，Bernanke反駁道，大蕭條如此的讓經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退是因?yàn)殂y行業(yè)的缺陷影響到投資的信用度。Bernanke 假設(shè)一種金融加速器機(jī)制，在這樣的機(jī)制中，經(jīng)濟(jì)的一個(gè)領(lǐng)域破產(chǎn)導(dǎo)致更多的不穩(wěn)固的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和緊張的信貸狀況。這反過(guò)來(lái)就導(dǎo)致投資的減少，隨之而來(lái)的是變少的貸款和普遍的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。如果對(duì)非金融企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊都是以破產(chǎn)的形式呈現(xiàn)，這些作者們?cè)谵q論經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷好似不會(huì)很?chē)?yán)重的。我們反而認(rèn)為非金融企業(yè)破產(chǎn)的連鎖影響遠(yuǎn)比金融企業(yè)的大，就像美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)。雖然通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手風(fēng)險(xiǎn)渠道，不會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生毀滅性的打擊。但并不是說(shuō)一段時(shí)期在大銀行間的經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷不會(huì)伴隨沖擊很大的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。只是因?yàn)檫@樣是經(jīng)濟(jì)失利不會(huì)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，也不會(huì)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的深度。不管是哪一種類(lèi)型的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)，這樣的破產(chǎn)在企業(yè)股份中不是常見(jiàn)的導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)損失的癥狀。因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)公司的倒閉導(dǎo)致其他公司的倒閉形成系統(tǒng)內(nèi)的一種聯(lián)級(jí)，這樣就會(huì)產(chǎn)生普遍的經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱的現(xiàn)象。當(dāng)許多金融公司同時(shí)倒閉，系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)減弱經(jīng)濟(jì)的破壞力度，就像在大蕭條時(shí)期，9000多家銀行倒閉。在前一種案例中，一家公司的倒閉，譬如像美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)，雷曼兄弟，或者貝爾斯登這樣的公司倒閉，會(huì)導(dǎo)致倒閉現(xiàn)象在金融界蔓延，例如信用違約互換。在后一種案例中，事實(shí)是許多金融機(jī)構(gòu)的倒閉意味著不僅僅是貨幣的供應(yīng)，而且只要經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中的破敗，就會(huì)降低信用額度。當(dāng)脆弱的金融系統(tǒng)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)的蕭條時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條就不會(huì)產(chǎn)生，因?yàn)楣究梢陨暾?qǐng)破產(chǎn)。而且如果只是一兩個(gè)公司的破產(chǎn)，非金融企業(yè)會(huì)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生更大的影響。這樣極端且真實(shí)的影響是金融企業(yè)的脆弱性導(dǎo)致調(diào)控者特別強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的預(yù)防。這些政策當(dāng)中，最突出的是“太大以至于破產(chǎn)”(TBTF的邏輯)，這一觀點(diǎn)的思維方式是，一個(gè)大型的金融機(jī)構(gòu)的倒閉將會(huì)影響到其分支的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，因此，對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是很大的。太大而倒閉是2008年隨著美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)決定合并貝爾斯登公司和摩根大通銀行之后產(chǎn)生的，在重建銀行貨代時(shí)期的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)是長(zhǎng)期資金管理，這一政策的決定是支援美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)。如果結(jié)果是阻止了經(jīng)濟(jì)的衰退，太大而倒閉的政策將會(huì)被證實(shí)。然而，如果在這一段時(shí)期系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)被夸大，或者所采取的措施的益處被高估，資金分配以避免另外一場(chǎng)大蕭條的效率代價(jià)體系將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出任何潛在的利益。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，在觀察另外一個(gè)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的時(shí)候，沒(méi)有管理者想乘機(jī)撤退。因此當(dāng)管理者推到一邊的時(shí)候，我們不能憑經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)考核決定經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況。當(dāng)今的美國(guó)，很少有管理者同意一家大的金融公司破產(chǎn)的。最近，我們可以看到雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)，這是美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)，逼不得已同意破產(chǎn)的企業(yè)。然而，雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)是唯一一個(gè)顯而易見(jiàn)的例子表明太大而倒閉的政策是名不副實(shí)的，我們只看到中意政策對(duì)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的微不足道的影響。此外，與此同時(shí)因雷曼兄弟的倒閉，此外,與此同時(shí),雷曼兄弟的失敗的情況下,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在干預(yù)商業(yè)市場(chǎng)、促進(jìn)貨幣資金,而美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)是跳傘了。而且，美聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備局和財(cái)政局即將散布第二次大蕭條的謠言，以彰顯其采取的措施的有效性。因此，我們將永遠(yuǎn)不知道雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)低迷，以及從雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)致使人們對(duì)破產(chǎn)的恐懼反映到現(xiàn)實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)上來(lái)或者管理者對(duì)人們的現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)體中存在的問(wèn)題的恐懼進(jìn)行無(wú)限的夸大。在本論文中，我們分析會(huì)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制。我們關(guān)注兩種可能引起系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題的蔓延：（1）信息蔓延，一個(gè)金融機(jī)構(gòu)的困境會(huì)對(duì)其他金融企業(yè)產(chǎn)生一系列的消極影響，主要是因?yàn)檫@些企業(yè)有許多共同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素。（2）對(duì)手蔓延，一個(gè)重要的金融機(jī)構(gòu)倒閉直接導(dǎo)致其他信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的危機(jī)，這些危機(jī)會(huì)產(chǎn)生滾雪球效應(yīng)，引起其他金融企業(yè)倒閉。太大而倒閉主義政策的有效性主要依據(jù)于這兩種系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的控制。對(duì)手蔓延會(huì)授權(quán)干預(yù)每一個(gè)倒閉的銀行，不過(guò)信息蔓延就不會(huì)。如果管理者不介入救助某一企業(yè)，要不就是任其倒閉。例如一家銀行，處理的過(guò)程包括以美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司作為其產(chǎn)業(yè)管理人，使其擔(dān)保的債務(wù)在很短的時(shí)間里還清。相反，如果破產(chǎn)的是一個(gè)投資銀行或者是對(duì)沖基金沒(méi)有參與美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司，這可能是很像第11章和第7章那樣的非金融企業(yè)。然而，我們所說(shuō)的非金融企業(yè)的債務(wù)是由證券行業(yè)保護(hù)公司承擔(dān)的，這樣的企業(yè)是要遵守證券行業(yè)保護(hù)法令的條例的第7章來(lái)停止經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)。這在很大程度上解釋了2008年為什么雷曼兄弟的持股公司申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)其證券交易子公司不在第11章的備案里面。對(duì)金融企業(yè)破產(chǎn)停止運(yùn)行最大的憂慮在于，減價(jià)出售致使倒閉和企業(yè)債權(quán)人對(duì)企業(yè)復(fù)蘇的絕望，這樣的減價(jià)出售還會(huì)使相關(guān)聯(lián)的企業(yè)具有負(fù)面影響，即便這些企業(yè)和倒閉的企業(yè)沒(méi)有直接的關(guān)系，不論是否經(jīng)過(guò)美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司