【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 50 50, 100 41 Pricing Problem Firm 1 Low Price High Price Low Price High Price Firm 2 10, 10 100, 50 50, 50 50, 100 ? Nonrepeated game ? Strategy is Low1, Low2 ? Repeated game ? Titfortat strategy is the most profitable 42 Repeated Games ? Conclusion: ? With repeated game ? The Prisoners’ Dilemma can have a cooperative oute with titfortat strategy 43 Repeated Games ? Conclusion: ? This is most likely to occur in a market with: ? Few firms ? Stable demand ? Stable cost 44 Repeated Games ? Conclusion ? Cooperation is difficult at best since these factors may change in the longrun. 45 Oligopolistic Cooperation in the Water Meter Industry ? Characteristics of the Market ? Four Producers ? Rockwell International (35%), Badger Meter, Neptune Water Meter Company, and Hersey Products (Badger, Neptune, and Hersey bined have about a 50 to 55% share) 46 Oligopolistic Cooperation in the Water Meter Industry ? Characteristics of the Market ? Very inelastic demand ? Not a significant part of the budget 47 Oligopolistic Cooperation in the Water Meter Industry ? Characteristics of the Market ? Stable demand ? Long standing relationship between consumer and producer ? Barrier ? Economies of scale ? Barrier 48 Oligopolistic Cooperation in the Water Meter Industry ? Characteristics of the Market ? This is a Prisoners’ Dilemma ? Lower price to a petitive level ? Cooperate ? Repeated Game ? Question ? Why has cooperation prevailed? 49 Competition and Collusion in the Airline Industry ? What Do You Think? ? Is there cooperation collusion in the airline industry? 50 Sequential Games ? Players move in turn ? Players must think through the possible actions and rational reactions of each player 51 Sequential Games ? Examples ? Responding to a petitor’ s ad campaign ? Entry decisions ? Responding to regulatory policy 52 ? Scenario ? Two new (sweet, crispy) cereals ? Successful only if each firm produces one cereal ? Sweet will sell better ? Both still profitable with only one producer Sequential Games The Extensive Form（擴(kuò)展形） of a Game 53 Modified Product Choice Problem Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 20 5, 5 20, 10 54 Modified Product Choice Problem Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 20 5, 5 20, 10 ? Question ? What is the likely oute if both make their decisions independently, simultaneously, and without knowledge of the other’ s intentions? 55 ? Assume that Firm 1 will introduce its new cereal first (a sequential game). ? Question ? What will be the oute of this game? Modified Product Choice Problem The Extensive Form of a Game 56 Sequential Games ? The Extensive Form of a Game ? Using a decision tree（決策樹） ? Work backward from the best oute for Firm 1 The Extensive Form of a Game 57 Product Choice Game in Extensive Form Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet 5, 5 10, 20 20, 10 5, 5 Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Firm 2 Firm 2 58 Sequential Games ? The Advantage of Moving First ? In this productchoice game, there is a clear advantage to moving first. 59 Sequential Games ? Assume: Duopoly Firm/100 10 and 100 Production Total 302121???????????PMCPThe Advantage of Moving First 60 Sequential Games ? Duopoly 1 2 a n d 15 r g )( S t a c k e l b eF i r s t M o v e s F i r mF i r m/ 1 2 15 a n d C o l l u s i o nW i t h 212121????????????PPThe Advantage of Moving First 61 Choosing Output Firm 1 Firm 2 , , 0, 0 , 125, 50, 75 , 125 75, 50 100, 100 10 15 10 15 62 Choosing Output Firm 1 Firm 2 , , 0, 0 , 125, 50, 75 , 125 75, 50 100, 100 10 15 10 15 ? This payoff matrix illustrates various outes ? Move together, both produce 10 ? Question ? What if Firm 1 moves first? 63 Threats, Commitments, and Credibility ? Strategic Moves ? What actions can a firm take to gain advantage in the marketplace? ? Deter entry ? Induce petitors to reduce output, leave, raise price ? Implicit agreements that benefit one firm 64 Threats, Commitments, and Credibility ? How To Make the First Mov