【正文】 distributed in class. Lecture notes shall be considered required readings. 1. Introduction The main issues Structure of the Course Games as Multiperson Decision Problems R OR Chapter 1 O MY Sections Zerosum games Minmax theory The Minmax theorem and LP R OR Section L 2. Normal— Form Analysis Beliefs and Best Responses Dual characterizations of Best Responses Iterating the “best response operator:” rationalizability, iterated weak dominance. R OR Section and Chapter 4 O MY Sections and 。 BERNHEIM, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 10071028. Fixed points of the best response operator: Nash equilibrium. Existence and mixed strategies. Interpretation. R OR Sections and 3. Games with Inplete Information The basic model The Harsanyi approach Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Interpretation. R OR Section A closer look: higherorder beliefs Common Priors L 4. Interactive Beliefs and the Foundations of Solution Concepts The basic idea: Harsanyi’s model revisited Correlated Equilibrium R OR Section L Rationality and the Belief operator Common Certainty of Rationality. Equilibrium in Beliefs. L O DEKEL, E. and GUL, F. (1990): “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK。 TAN, . and WERLANG, . (1988