【正文】 participants at the measurement date.” When quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities are available, they have to be used as the measurement for fair value (Level 1 inputs). If not, Level 2 or Level 3 inputs should be used. Level 2 applies to cases for which there are observable inputs, which includes quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, quoted prices from identical or similar assets in 4inactive markets, and other relevant market data. Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs (., model assumptions). They should be used to derive a fair value if observable inputs are not available, which is monly referred to as a marktomodel approach. Fair value is defined similarly under IFRS as the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties, in an arm’s length transaction. In determining fair value, IFRS make similar distinctions among inputs as FAS 157: Quoted prices in active markets must be used as fair value when available. In the absence of such prices, an entity should use valuation techniques and all relevant market information that is available so that valuation techniques maximize the use of observable inputs (IAS 39). It is recognized that an entity might have to make significant adjustments to an observed price in order to arrive at the price at which an orderly transaction would have taken place (., IASB Expert Advisory Panel, 2020). 3. Fairvalue accounting, illiquidity, and financial crises FVA and its application through the business cycle have been subject to considerable debate (., ECB, 2020。 Shin, H. (2020). The fundamental principles of financial regulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11. International Center for Moary and Banking Studies. Geneva, Switzerland. Citigroup (2020). Industry focus: . Banks, Research report by Citigroup Global Markets, March 2, 2020. Credit Suisse (2020). Letter to the SEC, File Number 4573, November 13, 2020. Coval, ., Jurek, ., amp。 FVA 既無需為經(jīng)濟危機負責(zé)，也不僅僅是一個沒有自身經(jīng)濟影響的資產(chǎn)價值報告評估系統(tǒng)。例如 ,我們指出經(jīng)理人擔(dān)心訴訟可能使一個市場價格產(chǎn)生偏差，這一 點不太可能發(fā)生。最后在第四節(jié)給出了進一步研究的建議。美國公認(rèn)會計原則以及最近的 IFRS允許把公允價值資產(chǎn)重新分類到一個 HCA減少損傷測試的應(yīng)用。但在實踐中存在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不能按預(yù)期工作的可能性。 區(qū)別隨著金融危機出現(xiàn) ,顯然這是不可能與模型對應(yīng)的 (參見國際貨幣基金組織 ,2020 年 )。首先 ,FVA 在“正常時期” (當(dāng)不需要立即采取行動 )介紹財務(wù)報表的波動。 Shin, . (2020). Liquidity and leverage. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 328. Allen, F., amp。 Thaler, R. (2020). A survey of behavioral finance. In . Constantinides, M. Harris, amp。在我們看來 ,設(shè)計一 套接受FVA 審慎監(jiān)管的系統(tǒng)作為起點會更好。最后 , 在這個問題上我們還需要投入更多的研究。我們至少可以討論兩個現(xiàn)實的問題。例如 ,它可能會把會計數(shù)字目的調(diào)整為確定監(jiān)管資本。 FAS 157把公允價值定義為“在測量日期，市場參與者會把價格當(dāng)做資產(chǎn)出售價格或以有序交易為基礎(chǔ)進行負債轉(zhuǎn)移支付。同時 ,重要的是要認(rèn)識到 , 在應(yīng)對FVA 潛在的問題 (例如經(jīng)濟危機時期 )時給予管理更大的靈活性可以使操作更方便。我們來看下面的四個結(jié)論。 Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? The Journal of Finance40, 793805. Disclosure Insight (2020). Comment letter on proposed staff position under FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, March 25, 2020. ECB (2020). Fair value accounting and financial stability. By ECB staff team led by A. Enria. Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2020. 公允價值會計的危機 :正確理解最近的辯論 作者： Christian Laux and Christian Leuz 出處： Forthing in Accounting, Organizations and Society 摘 要 最近的金融危機已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致了一個關(guān)于公允價值會計的優(yōu)缺點 (FVA)的激烈爭論。 IMF, 2020). The chief concern is that FVA is procyclical, ., it exacerbates swings in the financial system, and that it may even cause a downward spiral in financial markets. . GAAP and, more recently, also IFRS allow for a reclassification of fairvalue assets into a category to which HCA and less stringent impairment tests apply. . GAAP and IFRS have mechanisms to avoid negative spillovers in distressed markets and a downward spiral. To address contagion and procyclicality is not to have direct (mechanical) regulatory or contractual ties to FVA. For instance, it would be possible to adjust the accounting numbers for the purpose of determining regulatory capital. Such adjustments already exist. For example, for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve adjust bank’s equity as reported under . GAAP for unrealized losses and gains for availableforsale (AFS) debt securities to obtain Tier 1 capital (., Schedule HCR in FR Y9C). Thus, regulatory capital as calculated by . banking regulators is not affected by changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities, unless they are sold or the impairments are , Li (2020) documents that debt contracts often exclude fairvalue changes in accountingbased debt covenants. These examples demonstrate that it is not clear that contagion and procyclicality are best addressed directly in the accounting system. Perhaps these issues are better left to the prudential regulators and contracting parties, who in turn can make adjustments to the numbers reported in the financial statements as they see fit. In our view, this is an interesting issue for future research. In summary, Allen and Carletti (2020) and Plantin et al. (2020a)provide important contributions to the FVA debate by illustrating potential contagion effects. However, they do not show that HCA would be preferable. In fact, Plantin et al. (2020a) are quite explicit about the problems of HCA. Furthermore, they do not speak directly to the role of FVA in the current crisis because they do not model FVA as implemented in practice. As noted above, FVA as required by . GAAP or IFRS as well as . regulatory capital requirements for banks have mechanisms in place that should alleviate potential contagion effects. Whether these mechanisms work properly in practice is our next question. 4. Are there implementation problems with fairvalue accounting standards? Given the discussion in the preceding section, it is not obvious that extant accounting standards can be