【正文】 計實踐有助于緩解問題的蔓延。 我們從文章中總結(jié)了幾個建議給未來的研究。 第四 ,我們強調(diào)回歸到歷史成本會計 (HCA)不太可能解決的問題。同時 ,重要的是要認識到 , 在應對FVA 潛在的問題 (例如經(jīng)濟危機時期 )時給予管理更大的靈活性可以使操作更方便。 然而 ,正如我們第三個結(jié)論強調(diào) ,可能有問題在實踐中出現(xiàn)。此外 ,對其螺旋下降的擔憂是最明顯的 FVA 自身形態(tài)。這種洞察力有助于更好地理解辯論中提出的一些議題。我們來看下面的四個結(jié)論。貝隆 ,2020)。最后 ,我們確定幾個未來研究的方向。其次 ,在金融危機時期 ,盡管市場走向（或者單純 FVA）已引起廣泛關(guān)注，但是，適用于 FVA 規(guī)定的會計準則 ,在國際財務(wù)報告準則或美國公認會計準則是否行得通，這一點并不清楚。 Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? The Journal of Finance40, 793805. Disclosure Insight (2020). Comment letter on proposed staff position under FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, March 25, 2020. ECB (2020). Fair value accounting and financial stability. By ECB staff team led by A. Enria. Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2020. 公允價值會計的危機 :正確理解最近的辯論 作者： Christian Laux and Christian Leuz 出處： Forthing in Accounting, Organizations and Society 摘 要 最近的金融危機已經(jīng)導致了一個關(guān)于公允價值會計的優(yōu)缺點 (FVA)的激烈爭論。 Desmond, M. (2020). Marktomessy accounting change. , April 02, 2020. Brunnermeier, ., amp。 Magliolo, J. (1995). Managing financial reports of mercial banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital and earnings. Journal of Accounting Research33, 231261. Beaver, . (1981). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Benston, G. J. (2020). The shortings of fairvalue accounting described in SFAS 157. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 101114. Berger, ., Herring, ., amp。 Carletti, E. (2020). Marktomarket accounting and liquidity pricing. Journal of Accounting and Economics45, 358378. American Bankers Association (2020). Letter to SEC. September 23, 2020. Ball, R. (2020). Don’t shoot the messenger … or ignore the message, Note. Bank of America (2020). Letter to FASB. September 17. 2020. Banque de France (2020). Financial stability review. Special issue on valuation, No 12, October. Barberis, N., amp。 IMF, 2020). The chief concern is that FVA is procyclical, ., it exacerbates swings in the financial system, and that it may even cause a downward spiral in financial markets. . GAAP and, more recently, also IFRS allow for a reclassification of fairvalue assets into a category to which HCA and less stringent impairment tests apply. . GAAP and IFRS have mechanisms to avoid negative spillovers in distressed markets and a downward spiral. To address contagion and procyclicality is not to have direct (mechanical) regulatory or contractual ties to FVA. For instance, it would be possible to adjust the accounting numbers for the purpose of determining regulatory capital. Such adjustments already exist. For example, for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve adjust bank’s equity as reported under . GAAP for unrealized losses and gains for availableforsale (AFS) debt securities to obtain Tier 1 capital (., Schedule HCR in FR Y9C). Thus, regulatory capital as calculated by . banking regulators is not affected by changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities, unless they are sold or the impairments are , Li (2020) documents that debt contracts often exclude fairvalue changes in accountingbased debt covenants. These examples demonstrate that it is not clear that contagion and procyclicality are best addressed directly in the accounting system. Perhaps these issues are better left to the prudential regulators and contracting parties, who in turn can make adjustments to the numbers reported in the financial statements as they see fit. In our view, this is an interesting issue for future research. In summary, Allen and Carletti (2020) and Plantin et al. (2020a)provide important contributions to the FVA debate by illustrating potential contagion effects. However, they do not show that HCA would be preferable. In fact, Plantin et al. (2020a) are quite explicit about the problems of HCA. Furthermore, they do not speak directly to the role of FVA in the current crisis because they do not model FVA as implemented in practice. As noted above, FVA as required by . GAAP or IFRS as well as . regulatory capital requirements for banks have mechanisms in place that should alleviate potential contagion effects. Whether these mechanisms work properly in practice is our next question. 4. Are there implementation problems with fairvalue accounting standards? Given the discussion in the preceding section, it is not obvious that extant accounting standards can be blamed for causing contagion effects. But it is possible that, in practice or in crises, the standards do not work as intended. Ultimately, this is an empirical question and answering it is beyond the scope of this article. But we can at least raise and discuss two important implementation issues. Many have argued that both the emphasis of FAS 157 on observable inputs (., Level 1 and Level 2) and extant SEC guidance make it very difficult for firms to deviate from market prices, even if these prices are below fundamentals or give rise to contagion effects (., Wallison, 2020a, Bigman and Desmond, 2020). Consistent with these claims, the relevant standards in . GAAP and IFRSas well as guidance for these standards are quite restrictive as to when it is appropriate for managers to deviate from observable market , such restrictions should not be surprising. By allowing deviations from market price in some instances, standard setters face the problem of distinguishing between a situation in which a market price is indeed misleading and a situation in which a manager merely claims that this is so in order to avoid a writedown. Without restrictive guidance, the standards could be easily gamed. There is evidence that managers can be reluctant to take writedowns even when assets are substantially with this concern, current estimates of banks’ loan losses far exceed the writedowns that banks