【正文】 as major export markets kept growing rapidly. As we will see in the following sections, this is no longer the case today. The result is overcapacity and price wars, as well as a dramatic increase in the country’s exposure to debt. After three decades of rapid growth, Korea is now facing a major crisis. External factors, caused by the volatility of international financial markets, have acted as a catalyst。D capacity (Kim 1997a, chapters 6 and 7). In 1985, for example, there were 5,249 persons engaged in Ramp。D expenditures amount to only 54% (Kim L. 1997b). Inefficiencies of corporate technology management What really matters however is the quality of the Ramp。D model, in contrast to the progressive decentralization of Ramp。D has a very narrow focus: most of it is geared to development rather than research, especially process reengineering and product customization. This has led to a wasteful vicious circle of blocking research needed for industrial upgrading: the chaebols which have the funds for research, neglect it and prefer to focus on development activities. A further important weakness of the Korean innovation system, paradoxically enough, relates to the established educational system. Its heavy focus on the training of midlevel managers, engineers and technicians has been an important prerequisite for success during the catchingup phase. Yet today, as the focus shifts to research, product design and market development, the educational system is poorly equipped to cope with these new requirements. Korea’s educational system is characterized by a heavy reliance on formal education: in each field, the focus is on more classical material rather than more recent debates. Too much focus is placed on conformity and memorization, too little on creativity. Higher education has remained a glaring bottleneck in Korea’s technological learning (Kim L. 1997a). In short, as a result of its earlier success, Korea’s innovation system is now faced with new challenges. It is characterized by a number of structural weaknesses, which have been well identified and extensively debated within both the government and management circles. Yet the inertia resulting from previous success and established power structures appear to cripple Korea’s ability to adapt to the new industrial upgrading requirements. The search for a new policy doctrine and new corporate strategies remains constrained by a highly unequal distribution of economic and political power. 譯 文： 追趕，危機(jī)和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)：韓國(guó)的電子產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)進(jìn)化方面 簡(jiǎn)化模型 韓國(guó)模型有一個(gè)顯著的特點(diǎn)，那就是政府和大企業(yè)集團(tuán)（即財(cái)閥）的共生 關(guān)系。這樣的 結(jié)果 就 是 產(chǎn)生了 一個(gè)狹隘的國(guó)內(nèi)知識(shí)基礎(chǔ)， 而 反過(guò)來(lái)又使人們難以 去移動(dòng) 專業(yè)化 方向 。追趕需要一個(gè)有限的功能：一種 引進(jìn)和升級(jí)國(guó)外技術(shù) 和 發(fā)展生產(chǎn) 、 投資和細(xì)微調(diào)整 經(jīng)營(yíng) 能力 的功能。D；第四， 產(chǎn)業(yè)振興政策偏重 量化指標(biāo) 而忽視了產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí) ： ?根據(jù)其出口量 ? 不論 在乎 資本和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率 ，增值和技術(shù) 的成就 (Sun G. Kim 1995, )。 為了達(dá)到 產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)的臨界值， 在韓國(guó)的 R＆ D 投資將進(jìn)一步大幅增長(zhǎng) 。Kim I. Y. and Chung 1991。這對(duì)研發(fā)組織有著嚴(yán)重的負(fù)面影響： 韓國(guó)工程師和技術(shù)人員更傾向于 做屬于 自己的工作， 相較于日本同行更不愿意為團(tuán)隊(duì)付出 (Oki 1993)。 現(xiàn)有的制定優(yōu)先次序的機(jī)制非常的不完善： 每個(gè) 部委 設(shè)立了自己的方案 ，基本上都是自由的提出自己的方案目標(biāo)而缺乏不同程序之間足夠的協(xié)調(diào)。然而今天，重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到 了 研究，產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)和市場(chǎng)開(kāi)發(fā)， 現(xiàn)有的教育系統(tǒng)是不足以去應(yīng)付 新的要求 的。