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uce on concessional terms and will have to raise the valueadded and technological intensity of what it produces.’ (OECD 1995b, ) Today, there is an even more powerful reason for such a shift in Korea’s development paradigm: the country simply does not have the foreign exchange required to buy in foreign technology. Korea thus needs to create a broadbased and diversified knowledge base, especially with regard to product design, market development, the production of key ponents and the provision of highend knowledge intensive support services. So far however, Korea’s knowledge base is constrained by three main weaknesses: an insufficient critical mass of Ramp。 中文 2880 字 本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯 外文題目: Catchingup, crisis and industrial upgrading: Evolutionary aspects of technological learning In Korea’s electronics industry 出 處: Asia Pacific Journal of Management 作 者: Dieter Ernst A SIMPLIFIED MODEL A distinguishing feature of the Korean model has been a symbiotic relationship between governments and large business groups (the chaebols). This has given rise to the following vicious circle of truncated industrial upgrading a heavy reliance on credit and an extremely unbalanced industry structure has led to a narrow knowledge base, and a sticky pattern of specialization. The development of Korea’s electronics industry fits the pattern of largescale, capitalintensive lateer industrialization described by Gerschenkron (1962): easy access to large amounts of patient debt capital has been a critical source of petitive strength for the Korean chaebols. This has shaped key features of corporate strategy in terms of product specialization, type of production, size of mitment and entry strategy, vertical integration, petition focus and technology management. Korea’s successful entry into the electronics industry has been a forced march to develop a mass production capacity that can serve highgrowth export markets for homogeneous products。 very little upgrading has occurred into higherend and rapidly growing market segments for differentiated products and services. Once a decision has been made to enter a sector, the chaebols normally move in on a massive scale and in a highly integrated manner. By channeling funds at concessionary terms to a handful of chaebols, the state has created powerful domestic oligopolies. Korea’s extremely unbalanced industry structure has given rise to a peculiar form of petition strategy: firm growth has occurred through octopuslike diversification into many different and unrelated industries rather than through an accumulation of knowledge through industrial upgrading. The result has been a narrow domestic knowledge base, which in turn has made it difficult to move up the ladder of specialization. This development model worked well, as long as major export markets kept growing rapidly. As we will see in the following sections, this is no longer the case today. The result is overc