【正文】 tween petence and inpetence[61] ? Egocentric bias – occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would credit them. ? Extrinsic incentives bias – an exception to the fundamental attribution error, when people view others as having (situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic motivations for oneself ? False consensus effect – the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.[62] ? Forer effect (aka Barnum effect) – the tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes. Social biases (2/3) ? Fundamental attribution error – the tendency for people to overemphasize personalitybased explanations for behaviors observed in others while underemphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior (see also actorobserver bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[63] ? Group attribution error – the tendency to assume that group decision outes reflect the preferences of group members, even when information is available that clearly suggests otherwise. ? Halo effect – the tendency for a person39。s own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as 99% certain turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[16][48][49][50] ? Pareidolia – a vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, ., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing nonexistent hidden messages on records played in reverse. ? Pessimism bias – the tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them. ? Planning fallacy – the tendency to underestimate taskpletion times.[38] ? Postpurchase rationalization – the tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was a good value. ? Proinnovation bias – the tendency to reflect a personal bias towards an invention/innovation, while often failing to identify limitations and weaknesses or address the possibility of failure. ? Pseudocertainty effect – the tendency to make riskaverse choices if the expected oute is positive, but make riskseeking choices to avoid negative outes.[51] Decisionmaking, belief and behavioral biases (7/8) ? Reactance – the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice (see also Reverse psychology). ? Reactive devaluation – devaluing proposals that are no longer hypothetical or purportedly originated with an adversary. ? Recency bias – a cognitive bias that results from disproportionate salience attributed to recent stimuli or observations – the tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events (see also peakend rule, recency effect). ? Recency illusion – the illusion that a phenomenon, typically a word or language usage, that one has just begun to notice is a recent innovation (see also frequency illusion). ? Restraint bias – the tendency to overestimate one39。s ability to think about it from a lessinformed perspective. ? Decoy effect – preferences change when there is a third option that is asymmetrically dominated ? Denomination effect – the tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (. coins) rather than large amounts (. bills).[22] ? Distinction bias – the tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[23] ? Duration neglect – the neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value Decisionmaking, belief and behavioral biases (3/8) ? Empathy gap – the tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, in either oneself or others. ? Endowment effect – the fact that people often demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.[24] ? Essentialism – categorizing people and things according to their essential nature, in spite of variations.[25] ? Exaggerated expectation – based on the estimates, realworld evidence turns out to be less extreme than our expectations (conditionally inverse of the conservatism bias).[16][26] ? Experimenter39。 ? （ 3） 決策權(quán)重傾向于高估小概率事件（ π(p) ＞ P ）和低估高概率事件（ π(p) ＜ P ），即很不可能的事情卻被賦予了很多的權(quán)重，很有可能的事情卻被賦予低的權(quán)重；在中間階段人們對(duì)概率的變化不敏感。 ? 前景理論 (PT)則認(rèn)為：人們對(duì)概率的評(píng)價(jià)上存在“確定性效應(yīng)”。 （ 78%） 價(jià)值函數(shù) (Value Function) ? Kahneman和 Tversky(1979)給出的價(jià)值函數(shù)的指數(shù)形式如下： ? 其中： α和 β分別表示收益和損失區(qū)域價(jià)值冪函數(shù)的凹凸程度 。 ? “框架效應(yīng)”告訴我們：在人際溝通中，關(guān)鍵不在于說(shuō)什么，而在于怎么說(shuō)。 三、分離效應(yīng) (isolation effect) ? 考慮一個(gè)兩階段的博彩：在博彩第一階段，個(gè)人有 75%的概率出局得不到任何回報(bào)，只有 25%人進(jìn)入下個(gè)階段；第二階段，在下面兩個(gè)博彩間進(jìn)行選擇： ?博彩 A： 80%的機(jī)會(huì)得到 4000元； ?博彩 B： 100%的機(jī)會(huì)得到 3000元。 2)2023()0()220230( UUU ???2)2023()0()220230( ???? UUU效用 收益 0 1000 2023 1000 2023 損失 參考點(diǎn)效應(yīng) （ reference point） ? 這兩個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)其實(shí)是一樣的，只是玩了個(gè)文字游戲而已。 二、反射效果 (reflection effect) ? 1）在下命兩個(gè)博彩間進(jìn)行選擇： ?博彩 A：肯定贏 1000元 。稱(chēng)之為“參照依賴(lài)” 。稱(chēng)之為 “確定效應(yīng)” 。 ? 第二階段：估值階段 。 ? (3)Kahneman和 Tversky(1979)引入系統(tǒng)的非傳遞性和不連續(xù)性的概念，以解決優(yōu)勢(shì)違背問(wèn)題，即前景理論； EU理論的修正 2 ? (4)“后悔”的概念被引入，以解釋共同比率效應(yīng)和偏好的非傳遞性；如 Loomes和 Sudgen（ 1982）所提出的“后悔模型”引入了一種后悔函數(shù)，將效用奠定在個(gè)體對(duì)過(guò)去“不選擇”結(jié)果的心理體驗(yàn)上（放棄選擇后出現(xiàn)不佳結(jié)果感到慶幸，放棄選擇后出現(xiàn)更佳結(jié)果感到后悔），對(duì)預(yù)期效用函數(shù)進(jìn)行了改寫(xiě)（仍然保持了線(xiàn)性特征）。 ? 如果某個(gè)隨機(jī)變量 X 以概率 pi 取值 xi (i=1,2,…,n)，而某人在確定地得到 xi 時(shí)的效用為 u(xi )。 附： “埃爾斯伯格悖論” (Ellsberg paradox) ? 埃爾斯伯格（ Ellsberg， 1961）進(jìn)行了如下的博彩實(shí)驗(yàn)。 ? 賭局 B： 10％的機(jī)會(huì)得到 120萬(wàn)元， 89％的機(jī)會(huì)得到 100萬(wàn)元，1％的機(jī)會(huì)什么也得不到。 ? 第一組賭局： ? 賭局 A： 100