金融學(xué)外文翻譯word版(完整版)
【正文】 axonomy to parse the social world?！吧鐣谩敝傅氖侨藗?nèi)绾闻判蛭镔|(zhì)回報給自己和別人不同的分配?；セ菀馕吨藗冊敢猹勝p友好的行為和懲罰不利的行動，即使獎勵或懲罰導(dǎo)致實施獎勵或懲罰的人的物質(zhì)報酬凈減少。社會偏好的性質(zhì)可能將對維持共享食物的社會機制產(chǎn)生很大影響。行為規(guī)律在隨后的偏好互惠利他主義中被解釋為不公平厭惡或利他主義。博弈論由兩個不同理論組成：（1）使用博弈作為一種語言或分類來解析社會；（2）通過假設(shè)參與者最大化預(yù)期“效用”（自我價值）的重要性獲得關(guān)于參與者如何進(jìn)行一次博弈的精確預(yù)測，預(yù)先計劃，并形成對其他參與者類似行為的猜想。在經(jīng)濟學(xué)中，對上述結(jié)論的方式的主導(dǎo)的解釋是，代理商有社會偏好（或“社會效用”），考慮到收益和別人可能的意圖在內(nèi)。這種觀點的一個重要的修改是，進(jìn)化沒有配備所有的人具有相同的硬連線的本能進(jìn)行博弈，而替以創(chuàng)造學(xué)習(xí)社會規(guī)范的能力。（很多對這種觀點有貢獻(xiàn)的觀點指出，此類實驗多參與者來說有不同尋常的樂趣，可能比大學(xué)生玩Nintendo世界，500頻道有線電視，和網(wǎng)上沖浪更有樂趣。因為人類學(xué)家往往對社會規(guī)范和偏好如何出現(xiàn)、發(fā)展和各不相同的文化感興趣，這些博弈能夠為做實證研究的人類學(xué)家提供一個有力的工具。5. 結(jié)論博弈論已經(jīng)以兩種途徑在廣泛的社會科學(xué)中被證明是有用的：通過提供對社會情況剖析的分類；和通過對自利主義的參與者實際表現(xiàn)會如何做出精確預(yù)測。另一個優(yōu)點是可重復(fù)性。進(jìn)化建立專門的有效地重復(fù)博弈的認(rèn)知啟發(fā)式演化。在博弈論中最核心的概念是納什均衡。博弈論可以靈活的在許多細(xì)節(jié)層次的學(xué)科范圍廣泛使用。接下來我們首先在廣泛的術(shù)語中草擬理論。利他主義是無私的奉獻(xiàn)，而互惠意味著以其他參與者的歷史行為為條件的非自利行為。在其他情況下，這些人花費資源來增加別人的回報。 or learning by individuals from experience (., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998。 Camerer and Ho, 1999). 3. Theories of social preferences Within economics, the leading explanation for the patterns of results described above is that agents have social preferences (or “social utility”) which take into account the payoffs and perhaps intentions of others. Roughly speaking, social preference theories assume that people have stable preferences for how money is allocated (which may depend on who the other player is, or how the allocation came about), much as they are assumed in economics to have preferences for food, the present versus the future, how close their house is to work, and so Cultural anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists have sought to explain the origin of these preferences. One idea is that in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) or ancestral past, people mostly engaged in repeated games with people they knew. Evolution created specialized cognitive heuristics for playing repeated games efficiently. It is wellknown in game theory that behavior which is optimal for a selfinterested actor in a oneperiod game with a stranger such as defecting or free riding, accepting all ultimatum offers is not always optimal in repeated games with partners. In a repeated ultimatum game, for example, it pays to reject offers to build up a reputation for being hard to push around, which leads to more generous offers in the future. In the unnatural habitat view, subjects cannot “turn off” the habitual behavior shaped by repeatedgame life in the EEA when they play single games with strangers in the lab. An important modification of this view is that evolution did not equip all people with identical hardwired instincts for playing games, but instead created the capacity for learning social norms. The latter view can explain why different cultures would have different norms. 4. Why do game experiments? And which games? A central advantage of experimental games is parability across subject pools (provided great care is taken in controlling for differences in language, purchasing power of outes, interactions with experimenters, a
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