高級(jí)微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)常見問題分析(完整版)
【正文】 s game, we first pute firm 1’s reaction to an arbitrary quantity by firm 2. R1(y2) solves 1 1 2 1m a x ( y , y ) = m a x y P ( Y ) ? ?1 1 2= m a x y [ 1 0 0 y y ]Using the first order condition: 1 2 21 0 0 2 R ( y ) y = 0? which yields 2121 0 0 yR ( y ) =2Here R1(y1) is truly firm 1’s reaction to firm 2’s observed quantity. ?Since firm 2 can solve firm 1’s problem as well as firm 1 can solve it, firm 2 should anticipate that the quantity choice y2 will be met with the reaction R1(y2). Thus,firm 2’s problem in the first stage of the game is 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2m a x ( y , R ( y ) ) = m a x y [ 1 0 0 y R ( y ) ]? ?Using the first order condition: 210010 0 ( ) 02y? ? ? ?So we get: 2 1 0 0 5 0 5 0y ? ? ? ?1 1 21 0 0 5 0( ) 2 52y R y ?? ? ? ? ?Problem (e) is solved by 賴宇青 3023004028 Group work done by 李楠 3023004015 傅琴 30230040
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