【正文】 Under this circumstance, as was revealed in the interviews, the audit office, being at the lower level, would normally follow the government39。s discretionary disclosure policies on government affairs and are also heavily affected by the attitudes of CGOs. . Auditing gaps Most interviewees mentioned the same problem。s congress in appearance is an inevitable choice of the government audit office under the current system. The legislature therefore cannot directly exercise audit supervision and can only indirectly monitor the fiscal budget through auditing. The legislature also lacks other practical approaches and tools for monitoring the implementation of fiscal budgets and this limits its ability to obtain an insight into the workings of financial systems and budget implementation. The legislature can therefore play a very limited role in monitoring financial systems and fiscal budgets. 3. Reforming and Conclusion We carried out interviews in 2021 in order to prehend and evaluate the current government auditing systemin China and identify a rational and feasible approach to reforming the system. We also examined the impact of the recent “Audit Storm” on the government auditing system. The results of our investigation show that the current government auditing system in China lacks independence and transparency. The lack of independence affects the objectivity and reliability of auditing which is particularly important when auditing the implementation, use and control of budgeted funds by central and regional governments. It is this aspect of government auditing 7 that has the greatest need for audit independence. Our analysis of the “Audit Storm” shows that ithas increased auditing transparency and attracted much attention from the public, the NPC officials, academics, and government officials to the serious problems in managing public finance. It has also shown that government auditing has an important role to play in protecting public interests. However, merely drawing attention to the problems cannot prevent them from recurring. Also, government censorship means that many problems are not disclosed and it has proved difficult to extend the “Audit Storm” to local audit bureaus. All these weaknesses are rooted in the lack of independence in the current government auditing system. The “Legislature Approach” has been widely discussed among Chinese academics. Although it emphasises audit independence, it neglects the centralised nature of the government structure, the political tension between the government and the legislature, and the problems that the legislature itself faces. Therefore, implementing this approach in the current political climate may weaken the government39。此外，審計(jì)署經(jīng)營(yíng)在中央部委和分支機(jī)構(gòu)網(wǎng)絡(luò)非常大的直轄市審計(jì)根據(jù)中央的政府來管制各政府部門，機(jī)構(gòu)，國(guó)有企業(yè)，其他關(guān)聯(lián)機(jī)構(gòu)。 政府與立法機(jī)關(guān)之間的關(guān)系受到損害責(zé)任的事實(shí)是審計(jì)人員不獨(dú)立于政府的重大原因。 當(dāng)前政府審計(jì)制度審計(jì)改革已知的問題 大部分受訪者認(rèn)為當(dāng)前的政府審計(jì)的問題是與政府密切相關(guān)的，這實(shí)際上是一種行為的內(nèi)部審計(jì)部門在政府的直接控制。受訪者覺得難以回答這些問題。無論誰擔(dān)任，政府總部面臨的外部壓力使得她 /他會(huì)透露一些東西，解釋給人民代表大會(huì)，同時(shí)也節(jié)省了審計(jì)署的時(shí)間。隨著審計(jì)報(bào)告提交給人大，這就說明缺乏獨(dú)立性和透明度的問題已引起日益關(guān)注。我們假設(shè)政府總是不正確的事情。憲法（中華人民共和國(guó)， 1982 年）兩方面授權(quán)審計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)事項(xiàng)的政府總部。在審計(jì)過程中，如果財(cái)政部門告訴審計(jì)人員說，中區(qū)政府合署不準(zhǔn)許被審計(jì)的東西，那么，審計(jì)人員將沒有訪問的必要。我們 還研究了近期的“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”的政府審計(jì)制度的影響。所有這些弱點(diǎn)是植根于獨(dú)立在目前的政府審計(jì)制度的缺乏。 出處：楊 壽昌，賈森澤忠孝，莫里斯彭德爾伯里 ，中國(guó)政府審計(jì)：?jiǎn)栴}和改革 [N].國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)進(jìn)展， 2021， (24)： 119127. 。雖然它強(qiáng)調(diào)審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，但是它忽視了政府結(jié)構(gòu)，政府與立法機(jī)關(guān)的政治主張，以及立法本身的問題和面臨的集權(quán)性。12 缺乏獨(dú)立性會(huì)影響審計(jì)的客觀性和可靠性，這一點(diǎn)尤其重要，當(dāng)審計(jì)實(shí)施時(shí)，使用和控制的預(yù)算資金由中央和地方政府支付。在這種沖突的情況下，政府審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)只能把 政府的利益和要求放在第一，因?yàn)檎闹苯印袄习濉笔撬?。這種情況審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)在監(jiān)察財(cái)政和政府及其政府總部的金融活動(dòng)時(shí)可能會(huì)變得更加困難了，只是因?yàn)椴辉敢獗┞墩胁康谋锥?。這樣我們?nèi)绾文鼙O(jiān)督我們的上司？我們只是一個(gè)政府部門。 （ 3）審計(jì)差距 多數(shù)受訪者提到了同一問題 。審計(jì)署的一位官員指出：事實(shí)上，一些政府官員干涉審計(jì)署審計(jì)結(jié)果報(bào)告給人大。在這種情況下，如在訪談中透露，審計(jì)署處在較低水平者，通常會(huì)按照政府的意志來執(zhí)行 —— 這是可以理解的。 （ 1）缺乏審計(jì)獨(dú)立性 我們的大多數(shù)受訪者承認(rèn)，審計(jì)署的一些人或組織從外面直接或間接干預(yù)。 2021 年，審計(jì)署首次向公眾披露了四個(gè)中央部委存在的嚴(yán)重財(cái)政問題。 雖然在過去的 20 年，這個(gè)政府審計(jì)制度已給中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革開放做出了重大貢獻(xiàn)（中國(guó)審 計(jì)制度的研究小組， 1999 年），但是在面向世界時(shí)也遭受了缺乏審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的質(zhì)疑。在一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)全面崩潰的邊緣，中國(guó)將重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，開始了以市場(chǎng)為導(dǎo)向的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，并通過了 1978 年 3月的門戶開放政策，同時(shí)恢復(fù)政府審計(jì)與獨(dú)立審計(jì)并取代了 20 世紀(jì) 50 年代所實(shí)行的監(jiān)測(cè)機(jī)制。s congress even if the audit office carried out budget auditing at the government level. If the government determines the content of the audit report, budget auditing is in effect the government39。s congress and taxpayers outside the government are