【正文】 t investment。 there is little sign of any pattern between ECI and these recipient country characteristics. Similarly, Figure 3 is not indicative of any definitive patterns between ECI and corruption and political rights in these recipient countries. Textile and Garment Exports Rising Unsteadily Textile and garment exports are directly related with the demand of the importers. As the EU and American markets dwindled in 2020, and the prices of raw materials and working labors in domestic market kept rising, China39。 最后，有一些 大眾觀點(diǎn)也支持 中國愿意與一個(gè)不影響其腐敗程度 的國家做生意 ,有 很少一部分的人 支持 , 如果有 , 即中國主張是 和 政治權(quán)利有限的國家做生意。雖然在今年的財(cái)務(wù)困境的影響可能會(huì)清除，對(duì)于 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)步上升去 還是很難的 。專家 從中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)外交 政策環(huán)境分析，這些都將幫助中國的投資者和出口商，以適應(yīng)變化的規(guī)則。 但那些可能不利于成功的海外擴(kuò)張。他們能夠 用 低于其全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手 的 資本 而得到這個(gè)合作機(jī)會(huì) 。海外投資 的 出現(xiàn)作為一種工具， 能夠以獲得技術(shù)和自然資源。（見鄧小平， 2020 年） 然而，與預(yù)期相反，外商直接投資也與一個(gè)國家的政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈正相關(guān) 。在剩下的 文章中 ，我們更加細(xì)致的分析它們之間的關(guān)系 。 例如，如果 2020 年這個(gè)國家的能源出口的數(shù)據(jù)是無效的， 我們已經(jīng)取代能源出口與 1999 年的數(shù)據(jù)，如果 1999 年的數(shù)據(jù)不可用， 用 1998 年的數(shù)據(jù)。 這一直是目前比較流行的討論關(guān)于中國海外投資問題。由于在 2020 年歐盟和美國市場(chǎng)的萎縮，在國內(nèi)市場(chǎng)原材料和勞動(dòng)力價(jià)格不斷上升，中國的紡織品和服裝出口在波動(dòng) 之中 復(fù)蘇。 結(jié)論 中國 政府在經(jīng)濟(jì)合作相關(guān) 主持下，在一些國家進(jìn)行大規(guī)模投資。此外，能源豐富的受援國在九十年代受到經(jīng)濟(jì)合作相關(guān)投資的影響更多，在過去的十年里，他們已經(jīng)把重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)向了非能源礦產(chǎn)。但是一個(gè)地區(qū)的部分國家更可能形成國家化整體區(qū)域，而“金磚四國”的企業(yè)在全球國際化中會(huì)變得更大更有實(shí)力。他們還表明，雖然有一些盛行的說法支持中國愿意與那些不影響其腐敗程度的國家做生意，也有少一部分支持，如果有 , 即中國主張是和政治權(quán)利有限的國家做生意。此外，歐洲的債務(wù)危機(jī) 的 深化和美國補(bǔ)充庫存的需求的疲弱也將影響中國的紡織品和服裝出口。同樣，圖 3 是不 能 表明這些受援國 經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與相關(guān)投資 和腐敗和政治權(quán)利之間的任何明確的關(guān)系模式 。因此我們得出結(jié)論這些數(shù)據(jù)不會(huì)影響到我們估計(jì)它的真實(shí)性。 這些數(shù)據(jù)來自于發(fā)展中國家，目的是凸顯出中國經(jīng)濟(jì)合作和相關(guān)投資的顯著性。 然而任何的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作之間都是有因果聯(lián)系的 ， 若果沒有生深層次的合作，經(jīng)營牌照的許可是不能夠被發(fā)放的。（索旺， 2020； 張， 2020 年） 中國對(duì)外直接投資方向的決定因素的本身 已經(jīng)被 Buckley 等 人 研究過。例如，在香港投資基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的決定，旨在提高中國的影響力，這就是 在那個(gè)時(shí)候，英國的領(lǐng)土上，中國 所發(fā)表的聲明 。 因此，我們的結(jié)論是初步 表明，中國 政府 作為一種工具來使用的經(jīng)濟(jì) 合作，促進(jìn)中國跨國公司的海外直接投資（ CMNEs）。高調(diào)收購 IBM 的個(gè)人電腦業(yè)務(wù)的聯(lián)想中國和捷豹路虎 等 品牌的印度塔塔汽車公司是這種追求的功能的例子。出口商和投資者將不得不回避或解決這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)， 所以 他們能夠從這些市場(chǎng)中受益。受全球金融危機(jī)的沖擊，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的“游戲規(guī)則 ” 開始 受到 質(zhì)疑和 需要 重建。 我們的研究結(jié)果表明，投資模式程式化的 文獻(xiàn)很好地解釋對(duì)于對(duì)外直接投資的定向模式的因素 。 Zhan, 1995). During the early years of the reform process, Chinese overseas investments were dominated by large stateowned panies, and key investment decisions, including location of overseas operations, were dictated by political considerations (Hong and Sun, 2020). For example, the decision to invest in Hong Kong ?s infrastructure was aimed at enhancing Chinese influence in what was, at that time, British territory on which China had a claim. By 1992, the ideological debate about the direction of China ?s reform had been resolved, and encouragement of overseas investment by Chinese firms became an established part of the state?s long term strategy. Overseas investment emerged as a tool to gain access to both technology and natural resources. High profile examples of such investments include those made in Indonesian and Algerian oil fields, South African mines, the Brazilian steel industry and the US technology sector. Outward FDI was also aimed at providing Chinese panies access to overseas markets and international brands. Haier, for example, invested in production facilities in the United States to bypass quotas and antidumping measures, while TCL gained access to the Thomson and Alcatel brands. The 199298 period witnessed a cautious implementation of this strategy to go global, but the strategy has been pursued vigorously since 1999. There is a growing literature on the strategic aspects of the trans nationalization process of CMNEs (Sauvant, 2020。中文 5300 字 一、 外文原文 Chinese state’s economic cooperation Related investment: An investigation of its direction and some Implications for outward investment By: Sumon Bhaumik and Catherine Yap Co Sumon Kumar Bhaumik* Brunel University, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and IZA – Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn Email: Catherine Yap Co** University of Nebraska at Omaha Email: Abstract The Chinese state undertakes large scale investments in a number of countries under the auspices of economic cooperation related investment (ECI). While there are suggestions that it is an extension of China’s soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in those countries, often for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in the literature. In this paper, we examine this investment of the Chinese state over time. Our results suggest that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain directional patterns of outward FDI. They also demonstrate that the (positive) relationship between Chinese ECI and the recipient countries? natural resource richness is not economically meaningful. Finally, while there is some support for the popular wisdom that China’s willingness to do business with a country is not strongly affected by its level of corruption, there is much weaker support, if any, for the hypotheses that China favors doing business with countries where political rights are limited. Running title: China’s economic cooperation related investments Keywords: China。 Warner, Hong and Xu, 2020). Access to inexpensive capital can also be the oute of internal capital markets operated by Chinese conglomerates (Tsai, 2020). CMNEs are also able to leverage their relationships with the Chinese diaspora in the countries in which they invest, reducing the