【正文】 et discipline (2) intergovernmental entities operating with in a cooperative arrangement (3) administrative procedures carried out by an entity of the public sector. This paper focuses on the institutional and procedural backbone of decentralized governance. It illustrates that decentralization relying solely on munity safeguards will generally be insufficient to ensure propoor spending, and that there needs to be conitant emphasis on the generation of accurate and timely information on the actual spending, if not on the outes. This needs to be supplemented by effective mechanisms to detect, prevent, and punish misuse of resources or diversion of funds. Even with adequate monitoring of subnational spending, there has to be an emphasis on the effects of such spending, particularly the incurring of debt and other contingent liabilities, on overall macroeconomic aggregates. Again, the implementation of orderly macroeconomic adjustments will rely on the nature of the public financial management infrastructure at all levels of government. Source: Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria AlbinoWar, and Raju Singh. Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations. IMF Working paper,2021（ 108） ,. 二、翻譯文章 譯文 ： 國家公共財務管理：機構和宏觀經(jīng)濟的思考 中央政府在 透明的公共財政管理過程 中， 需要地方一級機構的配合，這反映了 其職能 的需要， 同時為了能和地方政府創(chuàng)造更好的下放管理效率，確保良好的問責制和競爭機制是關鍵因素。s Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank, 2021). However, there is increasing evidence that weak or absent public financial management functions and institutions are likely to negate any advantages that might be inherent in bringing public services closer to local munities. The underpinnings of public financial management relate to the basic institutional and procedural elements that might be enshrined in a constitution, or higher level laws on the budget, or laws or agreements governing subnational operations or levels of indebtedness. In some countries, such as South Africa, where the process has been nicely sequenced, there is a set of consistent and well designed legislation covering all the areas mentioned above. In order for any level of government to take responsibility for its actions, there must be clarity in its functions, its mechanisms for appropriating funds and prioritizing and authorizing spending, and ensuring that the spending is actually carried out and accounted for. Another critical aspect relates to timely and accurate reporting to the respective legislature and any higher levels of administration. In short, questions would need to be posed concerning the transparency and accountability of a government and whether these meet minimum international standards. Quite often the consequences of subnational spending can be shifted to higher levels of government, or across generations, if there is no hardbudget constraint at a junior level of government (Rodmen, Laidback, and Eskelund, 2021). This generally translates into weak or nonexistent control over borrowing. The borrowing might be explicit, for example, through issuance of debt or contracting of loans, or indirect, such as though the buildup of arrears or accounts payable. Under different constitutional arrangements, policy responses vary from enforced controls over subnational borrowing (generally in unitary states) to voluntary agreements or rules (in federations, as well as in supranational conglomerations of states, such as the EU),to sole reliance on the strictures of the market. The case for munitybased governance depends on the possibilities of local information generation together with the works of intermunity interactions or social capital. The bination of these factors could, in principle, generate spending tailored to local needs, with substantive local interactions in order to ensure that funds are not diverted from expressed objectives. And as stated above, international and donor agencies have raised these possib