銀行業(yè)風險預警指標原文-免費閱讀
【正文】 The supervisory authorities of Japan, Sweden, and elsewhere were similarly unprepared for the enhanced banking risks associated with the era of financial liberalization. Banking problems have provided an impetus to institutional reform of the supervisory agencies of the . and elsewhere. For example, recently created financial supervisory agencies in Japan and Koreaallowing greater autonomy, emphasizing rules rather than discretion in dealing with problem institutions, and forcing greater disclosure and transparency in the supervisory processappear to be appropriate responses to these countries39。s (modest) predictive power is Japan. Figure 1 shows the model39。The broader data set used in their studyincluding developing, emergingmarket, and industrial countries as well as those countries not experiencing severe banking problems as a control groupappears to give a less rosy picture of our ability to pick out early warning signals of impending problems. 他們研究的數(shù)據(jù)集合包括發(fā)展中的新興市場和工業(yè)國家以及那些沒有經(jīng)歷過嚴重金融問題的國家作為實驗對照組，但是，似乎給我們找出預警信號的能力并不如人意。What is surprising is that the other macroeconomic variables generally were not associated with the onset of banking crises. Simple accounting, for example, tells us that sharp exchange rate depreciation played an important role in bringing on or exacerbating banking crises in Korea and Indonesia in 1997 and many other countries.令人驚奇的是,其他宏觀經(jīng)濟變量一般與銀行危機的爆發(fā)無關(guān)。這樣，一個沒有經(jīng)歷過銀行危機的國家和經(jīng)歷過銀行危機的國家形成實驗對照組，實際上可以預測銀行業(yè)問題The study identifies two groups of indicators likely to be candidates signaling the onset of banking crises: macroeconomic and institutional. The choice of variables for each group is limited, of course, by the availability of data across a large number of countries and over a sustained period. 該研究確定了兩個可能預示著銀行群體發(fā)生危機的候選指標：宏觀經(jīng)濟和制度。Adverse economic shocks may originate domestically (for example, via recession, inflation, budget deficits, or credit slowdowns) or externally (for example, via trade or exchange rate depreciation). 不利的經(jīng)濟沖擊可能來自國內(nèi)(例如,通過經(jīng)濟衰退,通貨膨脹,預算赤字,或信用卡放緩)或外部(例如,通過貿(mào)易或匯率貶值)。s banking crises in the 1980s were over 40% of GDP (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996).在20世紀80年代，阿根廷、智利的銀行危機的解決花費的成本超過了國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的40%，所以說解決銀行危機的成本是巨大的（(Caprio and Klingebiel 1996)。The great majority of countries have suffered recessions following episodes of banking sector distress, with the cumulative output loss associated with periods of banking sector distress averaging about 10% of GDP (Hutchison and McDill 1999). 絕大部分的國家遭受到的經(jīng)濟衰退是伴隨著銀行業(yè)危機，隨著費用流失的大量積累，銀行業(yè)危機造成的損失平均約為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的10%（哈奇森和摩納哥戴爾 1999）These costs range widely across countries, of course.這些成本的涉及到了不同國家，當然，像智利和泰國等國家早在20世紀80年代初就遭受了嚴重的輸出損失，總計超過好幾年的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的25%。但是同樣我們也可以看到在很多國家和個別案例中，銀行各部門的危機具有共同的特征。 Reasons for banks39。channels and curtailed economic activity not only in those countries but in other parts of the world as well. Such high costs make it desirable to have some form of early 這就增加銀行成本，如此高的成本，使得建立一個銀行業(yè)風險預警系統(tǒng)迫在眉梢。banking sector distress in industrial and developing economies since the mid1970s. And they find the frequency is risingnine crises were marked in 197580, 34 during 在34年間，他們又發(fā)現(xiàn)頻繁地發(fā)生了九次銀行業(yè)危機，特別是19751980年，19911995，到了1997年出現(xiàn)了7種新的危機還有29中舊的危機仍在延續(xù)。相當于用政府的預算資金（通常介于610%的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值）去做一個巨大的承諾。 vulnerability to adverse shocks focuses on the special role of banks in asset maturity and currency transformation in an uncertain world with asymmetric information.大部分關(guān)于銀行易受到?jīng)_擊的理論中，銀行的特殊作用集中于一個資產(chǎn)成熟
公司管理相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號-1