【正文】 accounting quality and information asymmetry. This supplementary evidence also helps to address causation in my study. Specifically, my findings reveal an increase in accounting quality and information asymmetry in the post block formation period My study contributes to the literature in several distinct respects. Little is known about the association between large shareholders and firms39。 information asymmetry. This prediction is based on prior research which suggests that large shareholders possess information advantages over other market participants and that these influential owners actively engage in private information search. In as much as new blocks create a new opportunity for an influential shareholder to gain private information and/or engage in private information search, I predict an increase in firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. I conclude with an examination of the consequences of new block formations on firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. In those instances when the extantaccounting literature does consider the role of large shareholders, an implicit assumption is that all large shareholders share similar investment preferences, skills, and monitoring ability. Given evidence that large shareholder ownership is associated with firms39。因此，相關證據一致的增加或減少企業(yè)的會計信息質量和 /或水平信息不對稱與某些類型的大股東時，對投資者的影響評估當前和未來的投資。侵略性大股東占的比例 不大 ，但是， 顯著 。具體來說，積極的大股東已經被證明是更有效地影響企業(yè)的決策因素。 對于新成員的建立，我預測一個新成員的形成和企業(yè)的會計信息質量成正相關關系。這一預測與大股東在公司的監(jiān)測能力是一致的。 接下來，我檢查， LSH 是否基于市場的措施，企業(yè)的信息不對稱有關。 盡管從融資文學的令人信服的證據表明，企業(yè)決策由不同類型的大股東出席，股東積極主義的堅定和無數的證據表明，大股東被作為投資者類似的監(jiān)察組同質能力。這些文獻一般講述的是大股東由于他們有著大型股權投資，在企業(yè)作為一個獨特的位置 ，起著監(jiān)控經理和影響經營決策的作用。 鑒于大股東所有權與企業(yè)的經營決策和公司治理相關的情況，立法者和監(jiān)管機構在資本市場已經開始認識到，大股東履行著重要的監(jiān)督作用。最近的經濟衰退 ,增加大股東行動主義 ,以及新的安全交易委員會 (SEC)規(guī)則允許大股東更大的代理訪問，這些都激勵了我對此的研究。雖然威脅要更換整個石板董事的代理權爭奪，是相當罕見的（拜伯切克， 2020年）和昂貴的（ 金融時報 ， 2020年），美國商業(yè)團體似乎準備采取一切必要的步驟來對付這些新的 SEC 規(guī)則（伊格爾舍姆，2020）。此外，在過去 10年的研究中大多都集中在股東維權活動上。 應用的所有權異質性的三個措施，我首先檢查， LSH 是否有助于解釋企業(yè)的會計信息質量的變化。Laksmana,2020。 最后，我的分析側重于企 業(yè)的會計信息質量和信息不對稱形成的后果。這個預測是基于之前的研究表明，大股東擁有信息優(yōu)勢超過其他市場參與者例如積極參與信息搜索的這些有影響力的業(yè)主私人。具體來說，指標變量捕獲咄咄逼人的大股東 與 會計信息質量和信息不對稱 之間 存在 的 正相關 關系 ，而捕獲溫和的大股東 ， 指標變量 是不那么顯著的 。具體來說，我的發(fā)現揭示了會計信息質量和信息不對稱的增加 是 發(fā)生在投資后期的。 accounting quality and information asymmetry CHAPTER1:INTRODUCTION,MOTIVATIONS,AND CONTRIBUTIONS I investigate the association between large shareholders1 and firms39。 investment, financial, and executive pensation policies among different types of blockholders. In addition, many studies over the last 10 years have focused on the activities of shareholder activists. The shareholder activist literature suggests that target firms have lower Tobin39。 information asymmetry. I also predict that this relationship is influenced by the types of large shareholders present in a firm. Specifically, I predict that aggressive large shareholders are more positively associated with accounting quality and information asymmetry than moderate large shareholders. Since all large shareholders do not share similar monitoring capabilities, the aggressiveness as well as relative size differences of certain large shareholders contributes to the heterogeneity of large shareholder ownership. My final analysis focuses on the consequences of block formation on firms’ accounting