【正文】
在模型右邊的是有利的,左邊的是不利的。這證明了結(jié)構(gòu)的可行性,也證明了結(jié)論與之前的討論是一致的。然而,在對投資進(jìn)行簡單的加總計(jì)算時(shí)看出,中國可能是最大的競爭者,中國的汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)當(dāng)下專注于國內(nèi)市場,以實(shí)現(xiàn)在其經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷快速增長的情緒下發(fā)展和滿足日益增長的國內(nèi)需求(到 2020為止從 7%增長到 8%)。 預(yù)計(jì)未來外商對土耳其汽車制造商的投資 做出回復(fù)的汽車制造商同時(shí)也被要求預(yù)測他們的將來。 FDI 在汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)中的壁壘的假設(shè) 被認(rèn)為阻礙了汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展而因此成為后續(xù)的 FDI 進(jìn)入該產(chǎn)業(yè)的主要因素包括以下幾點(diǎn): 政局不穩(wěn)定,包括腐??; 經(jīng)常性的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī),伴隨高通脹,高利率和經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯; 低收入水平 —被認(rèn)為會(huì)消退潛在的國內(nèi)需求; 對進(jìn)口零部件(投入)的高度依賴 —也可以從產(chǎn)業(yè)無法實(shí)現(xiàn)足夠的量以保證當(dāng)?shù)氐拇怪币惑w化看出; 對最終汽車銷售的高稅收,從 37%到 64%。 三個(gè)積極因素應(yīng)該確定,這三個(gè)都可能成為競爭優(yōu)勢: 1.有競爭力的勞動(dòng)價(jià)格,這自然是指與歐盟的價(jià)格對比,而不是與其他地區(qū)的發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體(如之前用過的越南的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)); 2.良好的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,起碼在該國的西部 同樣也是個(gè)工業(yè)區(qū)擁有這優(yōu)勢; 3.過去幾十年以來的巨大的私有化體系。這些數(shù)據(jù)顯示無論是與發(fā)達(dá)國家還是發(fā)展中國家比較,土耳其未能得到相應(yīng)的市場份額。土耳其與越南的之間比較是非常明顯的;自從美國取消了他對美國公司投資的股份后,越南在經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)極低的情況下開始重新開發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì),即從 1975年越南戰(zhàn)爭的撤退后直接開始建立。處于發(fā)展中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體理所當(dāng)然會(huì)疑問:“我們能從這種資金的流動(dòng)中受益嗎?” 表 1概況了近幾年 FDI在全球的分布規(guī)模。 ? the consensus was nevertheless that moves into Turkey by Volkswagen and Nissan were not expected。 2. a welldeveloped infrastructure, in the west of the country at least, which is also the industrialized area。 production efficiency strategies benefiting from locationspecific cost advantages in sink economies。 and ? high taxes on final vehicle sales, from 37 to 64%. One consequence of these factors, in bination, was low utilisation rates within Turkish auto plants (of the order of 50%, as already noted). A consequence of this in turn is that unit costs are higher than would be the case were something close to full capacity use to be achieved. This in turn has made Turkish exports less petitive, in the EU for example, than might have been expected. In the case of the EU market this lack of petitiveness occurs in spite of markedly higher EU labour rates. This highlights an important point, made elsewhere in a Southeast Asian context, see Foster (1997), that simply having low wage rates available is an inadequate basis for an FDI decision. The point seems obvious once made but is often glossed over because the low wage rationale for FDI is the one most frequently discussed. The sense of Turkey being in an apparently strong petitive position vis224。 ? an already wellconstructed industry base in autos. The issue of managerial ability is of particular interest for Turkey’s future. In a study of UK firms engaged in FDI, it was notable that panies were more worried by lack of petent local management than lack of trained shopfloor labour (Foster, 2020). As for the threat of other emerging economies being alternative destinations for auto inward FDI, the responses showed that Turkey’s own CSAs would enable it to pete. In addition, the EU customs union agreement gives Turkey a direct advantage, even if all other factors are equal. However, perhaps the major petitor destination in simple aggregate investment terms is China and its auto industry is currently inwardly focused, . seeking to develop and meet growing domestic demand as its economy continues to grow quickly (of the order of 7 to 8% until 2020). The major change in Turkish life in late 2020 was the election in November of a new government. The two important factors concerning the new government are its Islamic roots and the fact that it has an overall majority in the parliament. The latter certainly offers the potential to deliver stable government and initiate necessary economic reforms which may have been infeasible for preceding coalitions because of the inherent fragility of those coalitions. The fact that the party has, as stated, ‘Islamic roots’ raises different questions in a country whose government was secularised by Ataturk some eighty years ago. So far the new government has s