【正文】 的舍友，是你們教會(huì)了我如何很好的與人相處，你們對(duì)我的幫助和支持，使我克服了一個(gè)又一個(gè)的難關(guān)。成長(zhǎng)絕對(duì)不是一個(gè)人的事，沒有別人的支持與幫助我們絕不可能完成。一些必要措施已經(jīng)促進(jìn)農(nóng)村地區(qū)的金融發(fā)展。此外，沒有農(nóng)村集體生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的合并，一些農(nóng)戶需要借貸應(yīng)對(duì)未來不良沖擊的發(fā)生。而高成本的運(yùn)行導(dǎo)致任何一家金融機(jī)構(gòu)很難向他們提供信貸。本文評(píng)估了農(nóng)村金融體系在各個(gè)階段的改革，特別是90年代中期的改革。1994年，中國(guó)政府出臺(tái)國(guó)家金融改革方案，強(qiáng)調(diào)金融機(jī)構(gòu)之間的角色互換轉(zhuǎn)化。自此以后，在文章撰寫之前考察改革的局限性，其基于在政策實(shí)施過程中發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題。其中省級(jí)行政單位中，只有西藏和海南被排除在改革。綜合性措施，旨在解決農(nóng)村信用社存在的主要問題。這種新方法開辟了多種所有制形式不必然維護(hù)農(nóng)村信用社的合作性質(zhì)。第三個(gè)要素是資金注入農(nóng)村信用社，幫助他們擺脫了已經(jīng)建立起來，在過去的財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)。然而，中國(guó)人民銀行還負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)督所有金融機(jī)構(gòu)。因此，中國(guó)銀行業(yè)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)（銀監(jiān)會(huì)），成立于2003年3月參加了由央行金融監(jiān)管中的作用，將負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)督農(nóng)村信用社。基金注資及優(yōu)惠政策關(guān)于農(nóng)村信用社財(cái)務(wù)不佳的情況下，中央政府決定采取四項(xiàng)措施。將要提供的資金量將是農(nóng)村信用社（依靠法人實(shí)體）等于負(fù)債權(quán)益差距實(shí)際發(fā)生額的50％（即資產(chǎn)損失減去所有者權(quán)益減去壞賬準(zhǔn)備）在2002年底，省政府將負(fù)責(zé)聚集資金的必要量，并決定哪兩個(gè)形式，他們想獲得從央行提供資金。由于農(nóng)村信用社的總債務(wù)權(quán)益缺口達(dá)人民幣330億，總經(jīng)費(fèi)由央行注入可能高達(dá)人民幣165億。然而，農(nóng)村信用社從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來表現(xiàn)來看，很大程度上取決于新系統(tǒng)是如何工作的。相反，省級(jí)政府試圖鞏固權(quán)力決定自己動(dòng)手。在這種權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)，省聯(lián)社可以很容易地為省級(jí)政府汽車獲得廉價(jià)信貸。盡管多次嘗試，農(nóng)村信用社，以及其他農(nóng)村金融機(jī)構(gòu)，仍然感到困惑的各種問題。第一輪改革實(shí)驗(yàn)中的八個(gè)指定的省份之一批評(píng)是單一模式的選擇在這些省份，也就是說，一個(gè)省聯(lián)社管理農(nóng)信社系統(tǒng)（沈2004）的形成。最后，中央決策者也應(yīng)謹(jǐn)慎看待被劫持到在改革進(jìn)程中注入越來越多的資金進(jìn)入農(nóng)村信用社的可能性附錄B 譯文原文China’s Reform of Rural Credit CooperativesProgress and LimitationsSince rural reforms were launched in 1978, the Chinese government has been searching for a new financial system that can facilitate the development of the rural economy. Several factors have rendered financial development in rural areas necessary. The marketoriented reforms have freed rural households from the control of the people’s mune. Being independent producers, they need credits from financial institutions for agricultural activities. The expansion of nonagricultural activities, typically organized by township and village enterprises, also fueled the demand for loans in rural areas. Furthermore, without the pooling of production risks of the collective, some peasant households also need to borrow against the future when adverse shocks occur.However, establishing a rural financial system that is suitable for China is a plicated task. There are hundreds of millions of rural households and millions of small and mediumsized enterprises scattered in large rural areas with poor transportation and munication infrastructure. Moreover, these rural households and enterprises only demand a small amount of loans. High unit costs will be incurred by any institution that supplies credits to them. Without government intervention, the rural financial market would only encourage the survival of usuryVarious experiments to reform the RCCs were carried out in the past two decades. However, the Chinese government apparently has not found a solution to all the problems in the system. This article evaluates the reforms of RCCs at various stages, with special emphasis on the reforms since the mid1990s. It should be noted that the reforms of RCCs and their performance were affected by the development of other financial institutions. Thus, we have placed our analysis of RCC reforms in the context of rural financial development in China. In the next section, we first give a brief account of the historical evolution of the role of RCCs in China’s rural economy before 1978 and then analyze the preliminary attempts of the Chinese government to reform the RCCs in the 1980s. In 1994, China introduced national financial reforms that emphasized the differentiation of roles among financial institutions. Then, we study how the reforms took place in rural China and why the major objectives were not achieved. The next section explains in detail the new reform initiatives in 2003–4, which aim to fundamentally change the governance and administrative structure of RCCs. After that, we examine some limitations of the reforms based on the problems revealed in the implementation process before concluding the article.Reform Experiments in 2003–2004After years of discussion, new reform initiatives were seen in June 2003. The Chinese government designated eight provincial units (Jilin, Shandong, Zhejiang, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Chongqing, and Jiangsu) as the first batch of experimental regions for the reform of RCCs. A policy document called “Plan for Deepening the Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives” (hereafter the Plan) was issued to explain in detail the measures to be implemented. In November 2004, the reforms were extended to another twentyone provinces. Among the provinciallevel administrative units, only Xizang and Hainan were excluded from the reform. There was no RCC in the former, while the problems in the RCCs in the latter were so serious that the central government decided to deal with it the wide adoption of the reforms, the Chinese government continued to call them experiments, indicating the possibility that the reforms could be modified in light of the realized impact of the initial changes.In the new reform program, it was reiterated that the general goal of the reforms was to transform the RCCs into local or munity financial institutions that would serve the needs of farmers, agriculture, and the rural economy. Comprehensive measures were designed to tackle the major problems of the RCCs. The program mainly consists of three elements. At the microlevel, the aim is to build up a governance structure with a new operation mechanism. The ownership of the RCCs would be clarified by establishing legal entities at appropriate administrative levels. The new approach opens up a variety of ownership forms which do not necessarily preserve the cooperative nature of the RCCs. There is no need for different regions to adopt a unified model of reform. Another important element is the strengthening of the role of the provincial government in administering the RCCs. The provincial governments will also be responsible for choosing the appropriate reform model for the RCCs in their jurisdiction. The third element was to inject funding into the RCCs to help them shed the financial burdens that had been built up in the past. If the RCCs are trapped in financial difficulties, it is impossible for them to carry out the ownership reforms. The new strategy of cleaning up the NPLs is very often dubbed “spending money to buy a new mechanism” (huaqian mai jiz