【正文】
ous flawed memories) ?有限毅力( bounded willpower); ? Presentbiased preference ?有限自利( bounded selfinterest) ? emotional behavoir 對(duì)理性人假設(shè)的捍衛(wèi) ? Second best: no reliably accurate and analytically tractable theory of inconsistence and foolishness has been developed。 social normoriented, not outeoriented: ? “the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is ?pulled? by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is ?pushed from behind by quasiinertial forces. Cont? ? The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the lookout for improvement. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, sticking to the prescribed behavior even if new and apparently better options bee available. The former is easily caricatured as selfcontained, asocial atom, and the latter as the mindless playing of social forces.” (Jon Elster, 1989, JEP) 為什么學(xué)習(xí)博弈論? ?博弈論是有關(guān)“互動(dòng)行為” (interactive behavior)的科學(xué) ? “ A sort of umbrella, or unified field theory for the rational side of social science. It develops methodologies that apply in principle to all interactive situations.”(Aumann and Hart, 1992) ? “It provides solid microfoundations for the study of social structure and social change.”(Jon Elster, 1982) Cont?d ? “Nash Equilibrium has had a fundamental and pervasive impact in economics and the social science which is parable to that of the discovery of the DNA double helix in the biological sciences. Nash formulated the basic vocabulary for a new language of economic analysis.”(R. Myerson, 1999,JEL) ? “More and more, the language of game theory has bee the language of economics. More and more, ?pure? theory came to mean game theory.” (Faruk Gul, 1997, JEP) 博弈論的基本假設(shè) ?理性假設(shè)( Rationality) : agents are instrumentally rational。 no knowledge can help. 合作問題 合作 不合作 合作 不合作 A B 3, 3 0, 0 1, 4 4, 1 合作與激勵(lì) ?合作問題的核心是激勵(lì) (incentive) ? 個(gè)人行為與社會(huì)利益的沖