【正文】 to the agents of the center for incorporation in the national list of appropriations, s well as involvement with actual implementation. In a federal system, he center would appropriate transfers for each level, which in turn would prepare their own budgets. There would then be a premium on ensuring that promised transfersit special purpose or general, “equalization” transfers—are made in a timely manner. Under either system, a fundamental rule for preventing rent seeking and ensuring accountability, throughout the entire budget process, is that there should be no spending without adequate appropriations and financing arrangements. In countries with the old Francophone PFM systems, funding could be provided to public entities without appropriations during the budget execution process, and “l(fā)egalized” as an ex post appropriation in the budget of the subsequent year. This practice clearly weakens the possibilities of ensuring government accountability. A typology of classification of borrowing controls described by TerMinassian (1997), refers to four broad stylized categories: (1) market discipline。 hence their desire to maintain a favorable credit rating in the markets. More recently, Argentina sought to follow this approach with the introduction of a Fiscal Responsibility Law and the establishment of a Federal Council for Fiscal Responsibility. Rulesbased approach In some cases, his central government might try to contain subnational borrowing by imposing a fiscal rule. Both federal and unitary states have relied on various standing rules specified in the constitution or in laws to control subnational borrowing, in an effort to confer credibility for the conduct of macroeconomic policies. Such rules introduce a constraint on fiscal policy to guarantee that fundamentals will remain predictable and robust regardless of the government in charge. Enforcing borrowing controls Three basic mechanisms are used by countries to enforce borrowing controls at the subnational level: (1) market discipline (2) intergovernmental entities operating with in a cooperative arrangement (3) administrative procedures carried out by an entity of the public sector. This paper focuses on the institutional and procedural backbone of decentralized governance. It illustrates that decentralization relying solely on munity safeguards will generally be insufficient to ensure propoor spending, and that there needs to be conitant emphasis on the generation of accurate and timely information on the actual spending, if not on the outes. This needs to be supplemented by effective mechanisms to detect, prevent, and punish misuse of resources or diversion of funds. Even with adequate monitoring of subnational spending, there has to be an emphasis on the effects of such spending, particularly the incurring of debt and other contingent liabilities, on overall macroeconomic aggregates. Again, the implementation of orderly macroeconomic adjustments will rely on the nature of the public financial management infrastructure at all levels of government. Source: Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria AlbinoWar, and Raju Singh. Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations. IMF Working paper,2021（ 108） ,. 二、翻譯文章 譯文 ： 國家公共財(cái)務(wù)管理：機(jī)構(gòu)和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的思考 中央政府在 透明的公共財(cái)政管理過程 中， 需要地方一級機(jī)構(gòu)的配合，這反映了 其職能 的需要， 同時(shí)為了能和地方政府創(chuàng)造更好的下放管理效率，確保良好的問責(zé)制和競爭機(jī)制是關(guān)鍵因素。這一疏忽部分原因可能是由于權(quán)力下放，以及以社區(qū)為基礎(chǔ)的產(chǎn)生有效和公平的支出決策 所導(dǎo)致的 。 但是 ，越來越多的證據(jù)表明，弱或缺乏公共財(cái)務(wù)管理職能和機(jī)構(gòu)很可能會導(dǎo)致接近 地方社區(qū)所固有的公共服務(wù)沒有任何優(yōu)勢。另一重要方面則涉及到需要 及時(shí)準(zhǔn)確地 報(bào)告給各自的立法機(jī)關(guān)和更高層次的機(jī)構(gòu)。在不同的政制安排下，來自各不相同的國家對實(shí)施的借貸自愿協(xié)議（一般指州）或規(guī)則（聯(lián)合會，以及超國家的團(tuán)塊的國家，如歐盟）有不同的政策反應(yīng)。但是，在實(shí)踐中有 倆 個(gè)實(shí)質(zhì)性的困難：一個(gè)問題涉及到是否有可能被 集團(tuán) 壟斷；另一個(gè)涉及到的問題是這以方案是否 有助于加強(qiáng)信息類型的生成。同時(shí)， 高原還強(qiáng)調(diào)了直接 挪用資金的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，除了 受 消費(fèi)或誤導(dǎo)消費(fèi)因素 影響 。 高原 的理論（ 2021）指出，選民未必愿意 選舉 腐敗的地方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，特別是受捐助者之間由于資金規(guī)模的競爭導(dǎo)致形成的不善言論 的影 響 。 全面性原則要求，預(yù)算涵蓋政府機(jī)構(gòu)所有的經(jīng)營運(yùn)作，使預(yù)算得到鞏固和完成，它是由一個(gè)具有國家立法權(quán)力的整體投票通過決定的。 以上這些原則，以不同的方式轉(zhuǎn)化為撥 款、會計(jì)、控制和報(bào)告要求方面的信息，這取決于使用的預(yù)算框架和連續(xù)為基礎(chǔ)的傳統(tǒng)的預(yù)算編制框