金融工程與財務(wù)管理12(文件)
【正文】 on Profit Manipulation of Listed CompaniesJiang Chuanhai（Research Institute of Accounting and Finance, Department of Information and Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai ,China,200433）Abstract This article studies the inherent motivation of listed panies who make profit manipulation. The theory and methods of asymmetric information dynamic game theory have been used in this paper, and profit manipulation of listed panies is modeled as a signal game. The research indicates that high profitearning type listed panies are more intend to make manipulation than low profitearning type listed panies, because they want to differ from the low profitearning type listed panies. This conclusion is well explained the empirical results in Chen Xiaoyue、Xiao xing、Guo xiaoyan（2000）.Keywords Profit manipulation Asymmetric information Bayes equilibrium578 / 7。其次提高操縱成本也可以強迫上市公司比較真實地披露內(nèi)部信息，減少利潤操縱的發(fā)生，這就要求證監(jiān)會改變對上市公司單一的評價指標(biāo)，設(shè)置多元評價指標(biāo)體系，增大利潤操縱的難度。這個結(jié)論較好地解釋了陳小悅、肖星、過曉艷（2000）的實證結(jié)果。但是高能力上市公司也不必選擇比更大的凈資產(chǎn)收益率。根據(jù)Kreps—Cho的直觀標(biāo)準可以得到。綜上所述可得：：上市公司的策略[]，投資者信念為式() 中的，投資者的策略為式()中的，它們一起構(gòu)成了博弈的分離完美貝葉斯均衡。那么，對于高能力類型的上市公司而言，為了能使投資者認識到其真實能力，不能在簡單地通過選擇完全信息情況下的來獲得投資者的投資，必須披露一個更高的凈資產(chǎn)收益率，在這種情況下，我們必須找到一個合適的分離點，使得
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