【正文】 horizontal M＆A , the author takes the technique and factor prices as variables to draw a conclusion that match the actual situation of the enterprise more, by changing the used premise. In addition, the author analyzes antipetition effect of horizontal M＆A with the reality of Chinese industrial concentration. From the analysis ，we can see that the industrial concentration of majority industry in our country is too low to form monopoly and has the antipetition effect. On the contrary, it can improve the scale economic of our country enterprise, promote the industrial concentration degrees, and strengthen the international petitiveness of our enterprise. Therefore, horizontal M＆ A is still the main trend at present. On this premise, the author takes the analysis of the welfare effect of horizontal M＆A for example, and deduce a conclusion that the parison between saving of resources and the decrease of the consumer surplus because of the price rising determines the positive or negative welfare effect of M＆A.The effect of vertical M＆A mainly includes the decrease of transaction cost and eliminating the effect of imperfect contract. The effect of conglomerate M＆A includes the following aspects: the industrial effect, the reduction of risk, learning curve effect, valid exploitation of property and scope economy effecte etc. The author uses the learning curve as a tool to analyze the industrial effect of conglomerate M＆A. The prehensive effects of M＆A include the effective distribution of social resources, the increment of anizational cost and financial synergy effect etc. The author analyzes the increment of the anizational cost from the point of view that M＆ A causes the anization structure variety.Key Words: Merger and Acquisition of enterprise, The effect of M＆A, Scale economy, Learning curve, Industry concentrationI / 70目 錄第 1 章 導(dǎo) 言 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????1 本文的選題背景、意義和目標(biāo) ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????1 本文的研究方法與理論創(chuàng)新 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2 本文的研究方法 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2 本文的創(chuàng)新之處 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2 企業(yè)并購(gòu)的內(nèi)涵 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????3 兼并 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????3 聯(lián)合 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4 收購(gòu) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4 企業(yè)并購(gòu)效應(yīng)理論述評(píng) ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4 并購(gòu)效應(yīng)理論綜述 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4 西方企業(yè)并購(gòu)效應(yīng)理論的新發(fā)展 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????6 國(guó)內(nèi)有關(guān)企業(yè)并購(gòu)效應(yīng)理論研究成果概述 ??????????????????????????????????8第 2 章 橫向并購(gòu)效應(yīng) ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????10 實(shí)證分析：橫向并購(gòu)——我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)的主流 ?????????????????????????????????????10 當(dāng)前中國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)選擇以橫向并購(gòu)為主 ????????????????????????????10 我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)方式實(shí)證分析 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????11 橫向并購(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng) ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????13 新古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)派的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)理論 ????????????????????????????????????????????????13 技術(shù)條件和生產(chǎn)要素價(jià)格可變條件下橫向并購(gòu)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)的實(shí)現(xiàn) ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????14 企業(yè)橫向并購(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)的條件和成因 ????????????????????????15 橫向并購(gòu)與市場(chǎng)集中度及橫向并購(gòu)的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng) ?????????????????????????????????16 橫向并購(gòu)與市場(chǎng)集中度 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????16 橫向并購(gòu)具有潛在的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng) ????????????????????????????????????????????????17 我國(guó)工業(yè)企業(yè)集中度分析 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????18 結(jié)論與啟示 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????20 橫向并購(gòu)的福利效應(yīng)分析 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????20 橫向并購(gòu)造成壟斷使得價(jià)格上升的社會(huì)福利效應(yīng)分析 ????????????20 橫向并購(gòu)使得價(jià)格下降的福利效應(yīng)分析。因此，當(dāng)前我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)橫向并購(gòu)仍是主流。最后在對(duì)我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)效應(yīng)現(xiàn)狀及其成因進(jìn)行分析的基礎(chǔ)上，從企業(yè)自身經(jīng)營(yíng)方法和國(guó)家宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)制度安排兩個(gè)層面提出了改善我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)效應(yīng)的可行的政策建議，期望通過(guò)本文的理論分析，能給我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)提供切實(shí)可行的理論指導(dǎo)，提高我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)整合的成功率，最大限度的發(fā)揮企業(yè)并購(gòu)的經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)，規(guī)避企業(yè)并購(gòu)的負(fù)面效應(yīng)。橫向并購(gòu)效應(yīng)主要表現(xiàn)為規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)、反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)以及福利效應(yīng)三個(gè)方面。筆者以橫向并購(gòu)為例對(duì)企業(yè)并購(gòu)的福利效應(yīng)進(jìn)行分析，從而得出并購(gòu)的福利影響是正的還是負(fù)的判斷主要取決于并購(gòu)導(dǎo)致的資源節(jié)約與并購(gòu)導(dǎo)致的價(jià)格上升引起的消費(fèi)者剩余減少而產(chǎn)生的福利損失之間的比較關(guān)系。 ????????????????????????????????21 結(jié)論與啟示 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????23第 3 章 縱向并購(gòu)效應(yīng) ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????24 縱向并購(gòu)的交易費(fèi)用降低效應(yīng) ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????24 新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的交易費(fèi)用理論 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????24 縱向并購(gòu)能夠有效降低企業(yè)交易費(fèi)用 ????????????????????????????????????????24 結(jié)論 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????26 縱向并購(gòu)的戰(zhàn)略利益和成本 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????27 縱向并購(gòu)的戰(zhàn)略利益 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????27 縱向并購(gòu)的戰(zhàn)略成本 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????28 縱向并購(gòu)與契約的不完備性 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????29第 4 章 混合并購(gòu)效應(yīng) ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32 混合并購(gòu)的產(chǎn)業(yè)效應(yīng)???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32 產(chǎn)業(yè)效應(yīng)存在的原因 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32 混合并購(gòu)與進(jìn)入壁壘 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32 混合并購(gòu)降低企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn) ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????34 混合并購(gòu)促使資產(chǎn)的有效利用 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????35