【正文】 e pattern of largescale, capitalintensive lateer industrialization described by Gerschenkron (1962): easy access to large amounts of patient debt capital has been a critical source of petitive strength for the Korean chaebols. This has shaped key features of corporate strategy in terms of product specialization, type of production, size of mitment and entry strategy, vertical integration, petition focus and technology management. Korea’s successful entry into the electronics industry has been a forced march to develop a mass production capacity that can serve highgrowth export markets for homogeneous products。 gross inefficiencies of corporate technology management。D. Fourth, industrial promotion policies were biased towards quantitative goals and neglected industrial upgrading: firms received support ‘…on the basis of their export volumes… irrespective of their achievements in capital and labor productivities, valueadded, and technologies (Sun G. Kim 1995, ). In the 1980s Korea’s parative labor cost advantages eroded, product life cycles shortened and petition intensified in the electronics industry. This has forced the Korean electronics industry to develop its own Ramp。D spending as a ratio of total sales increased from % in 1976 to % in 1990. While this is an impressive achievement, it is still less than half of the current Ramp。D budget, Korea’s total Ramp。 Kim S. G. 1995。 and Kim S. R. 1996). While external technology sourcing strategies ate highly sophisticated, the organization of innovation within these firms remains rather ineffectual and there is a huge potential for reorganization and productivity improvement. Organizational conservatism continues to prevail. If changes occur, they follow an outdated centralized Ramp。D organizations also has quite negative implications beyond the boundaries of the firm. It is probably one of the main reasons for the still very weak status of domestic linkages among the different actors involved in the process of technology generation and diffusion. This applies in particular to linkages between the large electronics manufacturing panies and their suppliers of parts and ponents. Most of these links are either with foreign panies or are internalized by the leading chaebols (Bloom 1992). Inefficiencies of Korea’s public innovation system Important inefficiencies also exist in Korea’s public innovation system. While the government’s share of Ramp。D. But this private Ramp。 這已經形成在產品專業(yè)化，生產型，承諾和進入策略，垂直整合，競爭的焦點和技術管理規(guī)模的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的關鍵特征 。 韓國的產業(yè)結構極不平衡，造成了一個特殊形式的競爭戰(zhàn)略：企業(yè) 是通過 章魚般的多樣化而進入 許多不同的和無關的行業(yè) 來完成 ，而不是通過產業(yè)升級 的 知識積累 。這種發(fā)展模式的結果是 生產能力過剩 和價格戰(zhàn)，以及該國所面臨的債務急劇增加 。 狹隘的國內知識基礎 狹隘的國內知識基礎 是阻礙韓國產業(yè)升級的 一個指標。 ”(OECD 1995b, )如今，又有了一個更重要的理由去轉變韓國的發(fā)展模式：國家已經沒有足夠的外匯去購買國外技術。D 支出的強大因素：他們推動著資金進入房地產投資而不是高風險的 Ramp。舉個例子， 1985 年在電子行業(yè) 從事研發(fā)的有 5249 人，而這個數量 占整個朝鮮產 業(yè)研發(fā)人員的 32％ 。 而韓國的人均研發(fā)支出 US$（ 1990 年）遠遠落后于 日本（ in 1992)和美國 (US$ ) (Lall 1997, Table 8)。專利的數字顯示了韓國存在一個問題：雖然他的 Ramp。 Kim S. G. 1995。 and Kim S. R. 1996)。 韓國和日本之間的一個重要區(qū)別是，韓國企業(yè)組織 等級 模式仍然盛行(Janelli and Ylm Dawnhee )。 這尤其適用于大型電子制造企業(yè)和零部件供應商之間的聯(lián)系 。然而，不同