外文翻譯---分析師建議和納斯達(dá)克市場(chǎng)莊家活動(dòng)(已修改)
2025-01-29 23:35 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 參閱外文文獻(xiàn)資料Analyst Remendations and Nasdaq MarketMaking ActivityStock analysts became celebrities in the bull market of the 1990s. In the bear market that followed, they became the focus of retail investor outrage, especially after regulatory investigations revealed widespread conflicts of interest. In December 2002, ten of the leading investment banks paid fines totalling $ billion dollars to settle civil claims brought by Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney paper looks at another potential conflict of interest in the stock market, the one betweenmarket making activity and analyst remendations. I find pelling evidence that at many security firms, market making activity is influenced by analyst remendations. For both 1999 and 2000, I find that market makers tended to accentuate their bid activity in anticipation of analyst upgrades. I estimate the potential profits from this activity to be substantial, approaching $600 million in a group of 47 large capitalization Nasdaq academic literature has focused on both the market power and bias of analysts. It has been well known since Womack’s (1996) pioneering work that individual analysts do impact stock returns. Analyst remendation changes not only produce large daily changes in security prices,but these effects also persist, for as long as six months in the case of downgrades. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001) also show that there is investment value in the consensus before the Spitzer investigation, research had documented serious bias in analyst have been too bullish overall. In June 2001, 15 months into the bear market,First Call reported that only 2% of all security analyst remendations were sells. Part of this bias reflects potential revenues from investment banking activities. According to Michaely and Womack (1999), lead underwriter analysts issued 50% more buy remendations. Their remendationsunder performed picks by unconflicted analysts by more than 25% per year for two ’s investigation brought into plain view what the statistical evidence could only hint was direct pressure within firms for analysts to slant coverage in cases where other profitable (generally investment banking) relationships existed. These links are illustrated by an from Kirsten Campbell to Henry Blodget, both Internet analysts at Merrill Lynch: “. . . we are putting half of merrill retail into this stock. . . i don’t think that’s the right thing to do. We are losing people money and i don’t like it. john and mary smith are losing their retirement because we don’t want todd [Tappin, GoTo CFO] to be mad at us.”1 (now known as Overture and recently acquired by Yahoo) was an Internet pany that Merrill
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