【正文】 1 The SarbanesOxley Act and Insider Trading around Financial Restatement Announcements 薩班斯－奧克斯利法案 和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述宣告前后 的內(nèi)幕 (部 )交易 Oliver Zhen Li University of Arizona Yuan Zhang Columbia University 2 Research Question 研究問題 ? Do insiders trade and benefit from trading around financial restatement announcements and does this pattern change after the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act? ? （內(nèi)部人士是否在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述宣告前后交易并獲利？） 財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述 ? 3 內(nèi)部交易 ? 4 5 What Inside Information?（什么內(nèi)部信息） ? Accounting Manipulation: Aggressive accounting（會(huì)計(jì)操縱：激進(jìn)會(huì)計(jì)） – Insiders may or may not trade during the manipulation period.（內(nèi)部人在操縱期間可能交易，也可能不交易） ? If price will go up further, they may postpone trades.（如果價(jià)格會(huì)上揚(yáng)，他們可能推遲交易 ） ? If the risk of detection is high, they may not trade during the manipulation period (Agrawal and Cooper, 2021).（如果被發(fā)現(xiàn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很高，他們也可能在操縱期間不交易） ? Investigation of Manipulation: （操縱的調(diào)查） – SEC, auditor or the firm itself.（美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)，審計(jì)師，或者公司自身） – A majority of our sample firms announce that they would restate financial statements filed one or two years ago.（我們的大部分樣本公司宣告他們會(huì)重述一年或兩年前存檔的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告 6 Yes! (是是是 !) Strong Evidence of Insiders Trading on Privileged Information（有基于特權(quán)信息的內(nèi)幕交易的強(qiáng)烈證據(jù)） ? Insiders sell shares before restatement announcements (之前賣 ). ? Insiders refrain from trading just prior to restatement announcements (靠近停 ). ? Insiders buy shares after restatement announcements (之后買 ). ? The SarbanesOxley Act（薩班斯－奧克斯利法案） of 2021 appears to constrain insider selling before restatement announcements (阻止了內(nèi)部買賣行為 ). ? Insiders make (avoid) a considerable amount of profit (loss) by trading before restatement announcements, especially preSarbanesOxley (內(nèi)部人士獲大利 ). – $ million for the long window and $ million for the short event window. 7 How Do We Test It?（我們?nèi)绾螜z驗(yàn) ?） ? We link insider selling activities (內(nèi)部交易行為 ) to restatement announcement abnormal returns.（重述宣告時(shí)股票的非正常收益） ? The greater the negative announcement returns, the more intense the insider selling activities before announcements. （重述宣告 /公告時(shí)股票負(fù)的收益（或者說損失）越大，宣告之前的內(nèi)部銷售行為越密集） – During Quarters 8 to 2, insider selling is negatively related to announcement abnormal returns.（在 8到 2季度，內(nèi)部銷售行為與宣告時(shí)股票的非正常收益負(fù)相關(guān)） – During Quarters 1 and 0, insider selling is unrelated to announcement abnormal returns. （在 1到 0季度，內(nèi)部銷售行為與宣告時(shí)股票的非正常收益不相關(guān)） – During Quarters 1, 2 and 4, insider selling is positively related to announcement abnormal returns. （在 2和 4季度，內(nèi)部銷售行為與宣告時(shí)股票的非正常收益正相關(guān)） 8 0 . 8 0 0 . 6 0 0 . 4 0 0 . 2 00 . 0 00 . 2 00 . 4 00 . 6 00 . 8 08 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4Q u a r t e rCoefficient on RACARCoefficient 相關(guān)系數(shù) 9 1 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 0 . 6 0 0 . 4 0 0 . 2 00 . 0 00 . 2 00 . 4 00 . 6 00 . 8 01 . 0 01 . 2 08 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4Q u a r t e rCoefficient on RACARP r e S a r b a n e s O x l e y P o s t S a r b a n e s O x l e yCoefficient 相關(guān)系數(shù) 10 Contributions (對(duì)文獻(xiàn)之貢獻(xiàn) ) ? To insider trading and restatement literature（對(duì)內(nèi)幕交易和重述宣告的文獻(xiàn)） – Evidence of insider trading (交易 ) and the timing of their trades (時(shí)間上之作手腳 ) around financial restatement announcements.（提供了圍繞財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述公告，存在內(nèi)幕交易和時(shí)機(jī)選擇的證據(jù)） – To regulators (監(jiān)管方 ) and researchers (研究人員 ) – It is difficult to find evidence of insider trading right before major corporate events.（在重要的公司事件之前短事件窗，找到內(nèi)幕交易的證據(jù)很困難） – The need to look at long windows.（需要從長(zhǎng)時(shí)間窗（或者說長(zhǎng)窗口）觀察 ) ? Very interesting evidence on how the SarbanesOxley Act constrains insider trading activities before restatement announcements.（為薩班斯－奧克斯利法案（可簡(jiǎn)稱為薩奧法案）如何約束重述公告之前的內(nèi)幕交易行為提供了非常有趣的證據(jù)） 11 Why Restatement Announcements? 為何 考察財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述公告 ? ? A salient negative corporate event (非常負(fù)面之公司事件 ). – A decrease in firm value（引起公司價(jià)值降低） (Anderson and Yohn, 2021。 Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 2021). – A decrease in future earnings prospect and an increase in the cost of equity capital (導(dǎo)致未來盈利前景下降，公司權(quán)益資本成本增加） (Hribar and Jenkins, 2021). ? Insiders thus have incentives to trade on the advance knowledge of the timing, likelihood and severity of financial restatements.（內(nèi)部人因此有動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行交易，基于他們掌握的財(cái)務(wù)重述時(shí)間、可能性和嚴(yán)重程度的優(yōu)勢(shì)信息） 12 Two Essential Aspects of Insider Trading 內(nèi)幕 (部 )交易之兩個(gè)重要方面 ? Direction and magnitude of trades（交易方向和交易量） – To trade to benefit from material （實(shí)質(zhì)性的） positive private information (to buy before / sell after good events).（基于實(shí)質(zhì)性的正面消息交易從而獲利 (好消息，先買后賣） – To trade to avoid losses from material negative information (to sell before / buy after bad events).(基于實(shí)質(zhì)性的負(fù)面消息交易從而避免虧損 (壞消息，先賣后買） ? Timing of trades（交易時(shí)機(jī) /時(shí)間安排） – Insider trading laws.（內(nèi)部交易法律） – Internal corporate insider trading restrictions (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon, 2021)（公司內(nèi)部關(guān)于內(nèi)部交易的約束） 13 Trading Before the Restatement Announcements 在重述公告之前的交易 ? Restatement announcements are associated with significantly negative abnormal returns （重述公告與負(fù)的非正常收益顯著相關(guān)） (Anderson and Yohn, 2021。 GAO, 2021 and 2021。 Palmrose, Richardson Scholz, 2021。 Hribar and Jenkins, 2021). ? Insiders thus have incentives to sell shares before the restatement announcements to avoid personal investment losses in restating firms.（內(nèi)部人故有動(dòng)機(jī)在宣告之前賣出股票，以避免個(gè)人在此重述公司的投資損失） ? The higher the announcement negative abnormal returns（宣告的負(fù)的非正常收益越高） , the greater the magnitude of insider selling activities before the announcements.（宣告前內(nèi)部出售行為的量越大） 14 Hypothesis 1（假設(shè) 1） The magnitude of insider selling activities before the financial restatement announcements is negatively related to the restatement announcement abnormal returns.（財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述宣告前內(nèi)部出售行為的數(shù)量，與重述宣告的非正常收益負(fù)相關(guān) ) 15 Timing of Trades（交易時(shí)機(jī)） ? Insider trading laws: Trading on the basis of material nonpublic informationis prohibited. （禁止基于實(shí)