【正文】 一、 外文原文 Is the 2021 . SubPrime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison Carmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland and the NBER and Kenh S. Rogoff Harvard University and the NBER The first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unaware regulators, and skittish investors. It also follows a welltrodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of subprime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number of major crisis indicators from the standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the runup in . equity and housing prices, which Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) find to the be best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows, closely tracks the average of the nieen major post World War II banking crises in industrial countries. So, too, is the inverted vshape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. Despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the early 2021s tax cuts, the runup in . public debt is actually somewhat below the average of other crisis episodes. In contrast, the pattern of United States current account deficits is markedly worse. The book is still open on the how the current dislocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bankcentered financial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over five percent, and growth remained well below precrisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of. 1. Post War BankCentered Financial Crises: The Data Our main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward parisons of the United States 2021 crisis with other postwar crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenh S. Rogoff, 2021.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present . situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much the “this time is different” syndrome has already been repeated. First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge runupin . housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to subprime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge runup in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in . productivity growth a fall in risk that acpanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized