市場(chǎng)失靈和微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策(2)-文庫吧
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【正文】 P D 0 Q Q0 Q1 S[稅前 ] S[稅后 ] P D P2 P1 P2 P1 ?科斯定理 ?假設(shè)交易成本為零，只要明確界定產(chǎn)權(quán)，市場(chǎng)將保證資源配置的效率，且資源配置與產(chǎn)權(quán)的初始界定無關(guān)。 （ 2）自愿協(xié)商：科斯定理與權(quán)利界定 ?科斯（ Coase ）： 1991年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主。提出交易成本的概念，推動(dòng)企業(yè)理論的發(fā)展 ?科斯定理的中心含義是：如果產(chǎn)權(quán)得到明確界定，如果協(xié)商或談判等活動(dòng)發(fā)生的交易成本為零或很小，那么在有外部性效應(yīng)的市場(chǎng)上，無論所涉及資源的產(chǎn)權(quán)屬于哪一方，交易雙方總能夠通過協(xié)商談判達(dá)到資源配置有效率狀態(tài)。 ? 合并。合并成一個(gè)企業(yè)，此時(shí)的外部影響就“消失”了，即被“內(nèi)部化”了。 ? 規(guī)定產(chǎn)權(quán)。如果產(chǎn)權(quán)是完全確定的并得到充分保障，有些外部影響就可能不會(huì)發(fā)生。 ? 如果給下游用水者使用一定質(zhì)量水源的產(chǎn)權(quán)，則上游的污染者將因把下游水質(zhì)降到特定水平以下而受罰。 ? 利益各方協(xié)商談判。 ? 其他方案。道德規(guī)范和社會(huì)約束。不扔亂垃圾。捐款。 外部性內(nèi)部化 Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities ? Consider an example of two agents, A and B, and two modities, money and smoke. ? Both smoke and money are goods for Agent A. ? Money is a good and smoke is a bad for Agent B. ? Smoke is a purely public modity. Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities ? Agent A is endowed with $yA. ? Agent B is endowed with $yB. ? Smoke intensity is measured on a scale from 0 (no smoke) to 1 (maximum concentration). Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA yA Money and smoke are both goods for Agent A. Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA yA Money and smoke are both goods for Agent A. Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OB 1 0 Smoke mB yB Money is a good and smoke is a bad for Agent B. Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OB 1 0 Smoke mB yB Money is a good and smoke is a bad for Agent B. Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities ? What are the efficient allocations of smoke and money? Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA yA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yB Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yA yB Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yA yB Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yA yB Inefficiency amp。 Negative Externalities OA 1 0 Smoke mA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yA yB Efficient allocations Without market OA 1 0 Smoke mA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yA yB Efficient allocations B’s most preferred choice Without market OA 1 0 Smoke mA OB 1 0 Smoke mB yA yB Production Externalities ? s s x s s x( , ) ( )? ? ? ?12 42 2and the firstorder profitmaximization conditions are 12 2? s 0 2 4? ? ?( ).xand ., suppose cS(s,x) = s2 + (x 4)2 and pS = 12. Then Production Externalities p ss ? ?12 2 ,determines the profitmax. output level of steel。 s* = 6. Production Externalities p ss ? ?12 2 ,determines the profitmax. output level of steel。 s* = 6. ? ?2 4( )x is the marginal cost to the firm from pollution reduction. Since it gets no benefit from this it sets x* = 4. Production Externalities p ss ? ?12 2 ,determines the profitmax. output level of steel。 s* = 6. Production Externalities p ss ? ?12 2 ,determines the profitmax. output level of steel。 s* = 6. ? ?2 4( )x is the marginal cost to the firm from pollution reduction. Since it gets no benefit from this it sets x* = 4. Production Externalities p ss ? ?12 2 ,determines the profitmax. output level of steel。 s* = 6. ? ?2 4( )x is the marginal cost to the firm from pollution reduction. Since it gets no benefit from this it sets x* = 4. ? s s x s s x( *, *) * * ( * )( )$36 .? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ??12 412 6 6 4 42
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