【正文】 營成果的最佳方式， 其中額外的資本利得，短期間看起來或許相當(dāng)特殊，但就長期而言，其對股東利益的 影響與日常的營業(yè)利益並無太大差別。 The book value per share of Berkshire Hathaway on September 30, 1964 (the fiscal yearend prior to the time that your present management assumed responsibility) was $ per share. At yearend 1979, book value with equity holdings carried at market value was $ per share. The gain in book value es to % pounded annually. This figure, of course, is far higher than any average of our yearly operating earnings calculations, and reflects the importance of capital appreciation of insurance equity investments in determining the overall results for our shareholders. It probably also is fair to say that the quoted book value in 1964 somewhat overstated the intrinsic value of the enterprise, since the assets owned at that time on either a going concern basis or a liquidating value basis were not worth 100 cents on the dollar. (The liabilities were solid, however.) 自現(xiàn)有經(jīng)營階層接掌 Berkshire(19641979)的十五年來，公司每股淨(jìng)值由 美 元成長至 美元 (持有股票投資以市價(jià)計(jì) )，年複合成長率達(dá)%。這個(gè)比率 遠(yuǎn)高於每年?duì)I業(yè)利益率的平均數(shù)，突顯保險(xiǎn)子公司股票增值利益對於股東權(quán)益的重要 性，而且 1964 年的帳面價(jià)值實(shí)際上超過其實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值，因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)帳列的資產(chǎn)不論是以 繼續(xù)經(jīng)營或清算的基礎(chǔ)來看，其價(jià)值都遠(yuǎn)低於帳面淨(jìng)值， (至於負(fù)債則一毛也少不了 )。 We have achieved this result while utilizing a low amount of leverage (both financial leverage measured by debt to equity, and operating leverage measured by premium volume to capital funds of our insurance business), and also without significant issuance or repurchase of shares. Basically, we have worked with the capital with which we started. From our textile base we, or our Blue Chip and Wesco subsidiaries, have acquired total ownership of thirteen businesses through negotiated purchases from private owners for cash, and have started six others. (It’s worth a mention that those who have sold to us have, almost without exception, treated us with exceptional honor and fairness, both at the time of sale and subsequently.) 我們極少運(yùn)用財(cái)務(wù)槓桿 (不論是財(cái)務(wù)面的負(fù)債比，或是營運(yùn)面的保費(fèi)收入與資本比都相 當(dāng)?shù)?)，亦很少發(fā)行新股籌資或買回自家股份，基本上我們就是利用現(xiàn)有的資金 ，在原 有紡織業(yè)或藍(lán)籌郵票及 Wesco 子公司的基礎(chǔ)下，前後總計(jì)以現(xiàn)金購併了十三家公司， 另外也成立了六家公司， (必須說明的是，這些人在把公司賣給我們的當(dāng)時(shí)與事後，對 我們都相當(dāng)客氣且坦誠 )。 But before we drown in a sea of selfcongratulation, a further and crucial observation must be made. A few years ago, a business whose pershare worth pounded at 20% annually would have guaranteed its owners a highly successful real investment return. Now such an oute seems less certain. For the inflation rate, coupled with individual tax rates, will be the ultimate determinant as to whether our internal operating performance produces successful investment results ., a reasonable gain in purchasing power from funds mitted for you as shareholders. 但在各位過度沈溺於歡樂氣氛之前，我們必須更嚴(yán)格的自我檢視，幾年前，年複合報(bào) 酬率達(dá)到 20%的投資或許就可以稱得上是成功的投資，但目前則未必，因?yàn)槲覀冞€須 把通貨膨脹率與個(gè)人所得稅率列入考量，投資人惟有將這些負(fù)面因素扣除後所得購買 力的淨(jìng)增加，才能論定最後的投資結(jié)果是否令人感到滿意。 Just as the original 3% savings bond, a 5% passbook savings account or an 8% . Treasury Note have, in turn, been transformed by inflation into financial instruments that chew up, rather than enhance, purchasing power over their investment lives, a business earning 20% on capital can produce a negative real return for its owners under inflationary conditions not much more severe than presently prevail. 就像是 3%的儲蓄債券、 5%的銀行定存以及 8%的國庫券，由於通膨因素使得這些投資 變成侵蝕而非增加投資人購買力的工具，同樣的一項(xiàng)每年可以賺取 20%盈餘的事業(yè)， 在嚴(yán)重的通貨膨脹情況下，也會產(chǎn)生類似的效果。 If we should continue to achieve a 20% pounded gain not an easy or certain result by any means and this gain is translated into a corresponding increase in the market value of Berkshire Hathaway stock as it has been over the last fifteen years, your aftertax purchasing power gain is likely to be very close to zero at a 14% inflation rate. Most of the remaining six percentage points will go for ine tax any time you wish to convert your twenty percentage points of nominal annual gain into cash. 而如果我們繼續(xù)維持每年 20%的獲利，這成績已相當(dāng)不簡單，而且無法保證每年都如 此，而這樣的成績又完全轉(zhuǎn)化成 Berkshire 股票價(jià)格的上漲，如同過去15 年來的情 況，那麼在 14%的高通貨膨脹率之下，各位的購買力可以說幾乎沒有任何增加，因?yàn)? 剩下的 6%將會在你決定將這 20%的所得變現(xiàn)放入口袋時(shí)，用來繳交所得稅給國庫。 That bination the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (., ordinary ine tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings) can be thought of as an “investor’s misery index”. When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor’s purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all. We have no corporate solution to this problem。 high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity. 通貨膨脹率以及股東在將每年公司獲利放入口袋之前必須支付的所得稅率 (通常是股 利以及資本利得所需繳納的所得稅 )，兩者合計(jì)可被稱為「投資人痛苦指數(shù)」，當(dāng)這個(gè) 指數(shù)超過股東權(quán)益的報(bào)酬率時(shí)，意味著投資人的購買力 (真正的資本 )不增反減，對於 這樣的情況我們無計(jì)可施，因?yàn)楦咄ㄘ浥蛎浡什淮砉蓶|報(bào)酬率也會跟著提高。 One friendly but sharpeyed mentator on Berkshire has pointed out that our book value at the end of 1964 would have bought about onehalf ounce of gold and, fifteen years later, after we have plowed back all earnings along with much blood, sweat and tears, the book value produced will buy about the same half ounce. A similar parison could be drawn with Middle Eastern oil. The rub has been that government has been exceptionally able in printing money and creating promises, but is unable to print gold or create oil. 一位長期觀察 Berkshire 的朋友曾指出， 1964 年底我們每股帳面淨(jìng)值約可換得半盎 斯黃金，十五年之後，在我們流血流汗地努力耕耘後，每股帳面淨(jìng)值還是只能換得半 盎斯黃金，相同的道理也可以適用於中東地區(qū)的石油之上，關(guān)鍵就在於我們的政府只 會印鈔票及劃大餅，卻不會出產(chǎn)黃金或石油。 We intend to continue to do as well as we can in managing the internal affairs of the business. But you should understand that external conditions affecting the stability of currency may very well be the most imp