【正文】 EPS.，同時原來 LTE中的 Currentnative就自動地變?yōu)?NonCurrent，并覆蓋原來的 NonCurrent。Native.Current NonCurrentFull(Knas)Partial(noEPSKnas)AKANAS SMC從 GERAN/UTRAN切換到 LTE從 GERAN/UTRAN切換到 LTEEPS.? 當(dāng) UE關(guān)機(jī)或進(jìn)入 DEREGISTER狀態(tài)時， EMMMemeory中。.? 當(dāng) UE關(guān)機(jī)或進(jìn)入 DEREGISTER狀態(tài)時， ME中的 EMMMemeory中并標(biāo)識有效，還標(biāo)識 ME中的（相當(dāng)于刪除）。.（如果標(biāo)識為有效） .UMTSUSIMEUTRANMEEUTRANUSIMEUTRANMEEMM. EMMEPSthereceivesTAUorRequestwithnoncurrentEPSthencontexttheEPSandMMEdeleteexistingEPSarunaSMCtoeKSIwithEPSthisbeescurrentsecurity contextshallanycurrentsecurity context.Mapped. Not當(dāng) UE從 G/U通過 IdleNativeNativeEPS(Native).執(zhí)行了 EPS KSIasme。allowedFullEPSAKA過程，并且通過 NASNative但 UE進(jìn)入 GERAN/UTRAN后通過 UMTS.，當(dāng) UE切換到回 LTE時，Mapped Current時，則 Kasme0就成為了 NonCurrent。AKA過程，并且通過 NASStorageinUEpoweroff. in the ME volatile Memory USIM ME NVMEMEMM capable in USIMNo EMM capable in USIMFullEPSFullStoredmarkedvalidN/A Any.markedornativeisandmapped.partialEPSnativeisinvalidremoved.主要內(nèi)容? EPS 安全綜述? EPS AKA與 ? EPS MM程與 HO過程中的安全? EPS KDF? EPS EEA1/2/3與 EIA/1/2/3算法EPSandAgreemenAKA? IfkeysIKfromEPSrunstoredthealreadyonUSIMstoringCKIKcouldtokeysfromearlierofAKA.wouldtowhensecurity contextUMTSweresimultaneouslyiscasesecurity contextstoredforpurposesIdleSignaling? Therefore,roamingaisintoMEnecessitateEPSauthenticationifUSIMnotEMMstorage.AKA過程中產(chǎn)生的 CK,IK不能存貯于 USIM中存貯 UMTS USIM應(yīng)當(dāng)為 EPS若 USIM不支持 EMMCK,IK必須存貯在 ME中。Files，當(dāng) USIM卡換 ME時，則必須要執(zhí)行 EPSEPSAuthenticationAVAVAV(3)XRESAUTNKasme CK IK KcEPSauthenticationAKA)HSSAMF RANDSQN Kf1 f2 f3 f4 f5MACXRES CK IKAKAMFSQN SQN(+)AKAMFMACMAC認(rèn)證向量五元組認(rèn)證令牌認(rèn)證算法認(rèn)證配置RAND AUTNHSS25UMTSHSSAMF RANDSQN Kf1 f2 f3 f4 f5MACXRESCK IK AKAMFSQN SQN(+)AKAMFMACMAC認(rèn)證向量四元組認(rèn)證令牌認(rèn)證算法認(rèn)證配置RAND AUTNSNIdKasmeHSS27EPSservingdomainss belonging to different serving domains (PLMNs)UMTS authentication vectors that were previously received from an SGSN shall not be forwarded between MME39。EPSinsameUMTSinsameUMTSinsameID? SNIK,id,)? Kasme的產(chǎn)生與 SNid發(fā)生改變時，則原來的 Kasme不能使用。AKA。COUNTCount(復(fù)位）AKA. MappingUTRAN/GERAN?EUTRANinidle Mobility TheCOUNTsnotresetidlemobilityhandoveranexistingEPSsecurity context.也就是說 NAS? ThesecuritymandfromtoshalltheUEcapabilities,selectedalgorithms,eKSIidentifyingandNONCEueNONCEmmetheofacontextidleThisshallintegrity(butciphered)NASkeyonindicatedtheinmessage? TheshalltheofNASmodemessage.includesthatUEcapabilitiesbyMMEthestoredthetothatweremodifiedanandtheprotectiontheNASalgorithmtheintegritybasedKASMEbyeKSI.addition,creatingmappedforcasein,UEensurereceivedissamethesenttheRequestalsoK39。fromIKthenoncesAnnex? Ifverified,UEstartintegrityandwithsecurity contextsendsNASmodemessageMMEandprotectedNASmodemessageincludeinMMEittheSMCmessage.? TheshallandtheprotectiontheSecurityCompletetheandindicatedtheSecurityCommand.downlinkatMMEthisshallafterthesecuritypleteNASdecipheringthewithcontextafterthesecuritymandMME UENAS (UE , Selected NAS Algoritm, eKSI, IMEISV Request, NONCEue, NONCEmme, NASMAC)NAS ( IMEISV, NASMAC )Start . (de)CipheringStart UL deCipheringStart DLCipheringStart .Nonce? IfMMEnottheindicatedtheinTAUorTAUwasunprotected,MMEcreatenewsecurity(thatbeecurrentcontext).thistheshallaNONCEmmeandtheNONCEuethetoamappedASMECKIK,CK,werebyKSIPTMSItheRequest.AnnexforinformationhowderivefreshASME.MMEaSecuritymandwithUEtheNONCEUE,NONCEMMEtheSecuritymand.uplinkdownlinkCOUNTmappedcontextbetovalue0)newsecurityisinandcreatingmappedforcasein,UEensurereceivedissamethesenttheRequestalsoK39。fromIKthenoncesAnnexASASmodemessageeNBUEcontainselectedalgorithms.messagebeprotectedRRCkeyoncurrent? ThesecuritypletefromtoshallintegritywithselectedalgorithminASmodemessageRRCkeyoncurrent? RRCUPcipheringateNBstartsendingASmodemessage.anduplink(decryption)theshallafterandverificationthesecurityplete? RRCUPcipheringatUEstartsendingASmodemessage.anddownlink(decryption)theshallafterandverificationthesecuritymandASSMC與 NASSMC正在進(jìn)行– 1:MME不應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)起觸發(fā) ASSMC后才繼續(xù) InterMME? InterENB源 ENBSMC的 S1AP過程– 5：源 ENB當(dāng) ASSMC，但在 HOSwitchAcknowledge中使用 Old.– 4： UE收到 NASASSMC的 SAAP正在進(jìn)行中– 2： MME不應(yīng)當(dāng)發(fā)起 NASHO? NASHO，新舊 MME則繼續(xù)使用 Old同時在 S10接口上傳輸兩套 .主要內(nèi)容? EPS 安全綜述? EPS AKA與 ? EPS MM程與 HO過程中的安全? EPS KDF? EPS EEA1/2/3與 EIA/1/2/3算法EPS MM程與 HO過程中的安全? LTE內(nèi)的狀態(tài)遷移時的安全上下文的處理? LTE內(nèi) TAU過程。Handover過程? LTE與 UMTS之間的切換過程TransitionEMMDEREGISTERED? Ifandhavefullnativesecurity contextamappedsecurity context,theymakenoncurrentEPStheone.? UEMMEdeletemappedpartialsecurity contextshold.NCFNCPCMCFEMMDEREGISTEREDEMMREGISTEREDCFEUSIM MEUSIM MECFToDetachPowerDetachSubscriptionEMMDEREG.TAUFromRequest.MMEnew.If there is no . in MME, AKA is runned.CF AttachwithandMMEnew.If there is no . in MME, AKA is runned.AttachwithoutRunsAKAECMIDLEECMCONNECTED初始化的 NAS消息不能加密NCPCFEUSIM MEMENCPCFCFCFKnasint 對初始化的 NAS消息進(jìn)行 Knasint 對初始化的 NAS消息進(jìn)行 進(jìn)入 ECMConnected時， MME將 EUSIM中的 CF標(biāo)識為無效！以保證 ME中的 CF是有效的。FromtoUESetup(UEKenb)Kenb?f(Kasme)NCC?0AKAUL/DLCount?0當(dāng) MME改變且 PLMNID發(fā)生改變時，必須要執(zhí)行，否則根據(jù) MME的 Policy來決定NASIpAlg),僅僅用于 (extended) Service Request消息或 TAU With Active Flag消息Fromto?對于 FullKnasint,Knasenc不存貯USIM?UENativeeNBInitialSetup,Context,0?afterS1APContextRequestTAU? K’asmef(CK||IK,withGUTI,)ContextGUTI,TAU)ContextMMUEEPSEPS)TAUL