轉(zhuǎn)型國(guó)家民營(yíng)銀行的發(fā)展研究外文翻譯-在線瀏覽
2024-09-26 18:43本頁(yè)面
【正文】 ral sector. on bank funded longterm capital projects and infrastructure ,banking activities were both subservient to the plan and segmented along functional lines in CPEs. In the transition economies (TEs), the first step in banking sector reform involved creating a twotier system with mercial banking activities carved out of the old central bank. At the beginning of the decade, the new banking sectors in the former CPEs consisted of the newly created mercial banks and the specialty banks, both types having universal banking licenses, along with a few foreign Greenfield banks and often many relatively undercapitalized Renovo domestic private banks that were born under lax entry banks had virtual monopolies in their core activities, ., the savings bank was often the only entity with an extensive enough branch network throughout the country to collect primary deposits. Typically, three or four large banks dominated the emerging banking sector in a TE. Both the newly created mercial entities and the specialty banks were stateowned initially. Hence, structural segmentation, a proliferation of weak small domestic private banks, and stateownership of the large banks were the major features of banking sectors in TEs at the beginning of the 1990s.These legacies affected the banking sectors in all of the countries in our sample with the exception of Croatia, which was part of Yugoslavia. From the 1950s, mercial banks in Croatia as well as the other republics were not stateowned but were owned collectively according to the Yugoslavian system of selfmanagement. Virtually all foreign exchange deposits collected by the republiclevel banks were remitted to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in exchange for credits in dinars. Upon succession in June 1991, the Yugoslavian government froze the foreign exchange deposits of Croatian banks. Hence, Croatian banks faced a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities creating large holes in their balance sheets after succession. At the end of 1995, four Croatian banks were selected for government rehabilitation because of the poor quality of their loan portfolios. Involvement in this program resulted in these banks being nationalized so that four large stateowned banks were created in Croatia in the middle of the 1990s. The three more advanced TEs, ., Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, embarked on significantly different bank privatizations programs during the first half of the 1990s. Even before the political change, the Hungarian government had been receptive to foreign bank activity as it allowed three foreign banks to operate in the country from 1985. By the end of 1994, the Hungarian foreign trade bank had been purchased by a foreign owner and foreign investors held about 20% of total banking assets in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, three of the largest four banks participated in the first wave of voucher privatization in 1992. Both of the southeastern TEs,., Bulgaria and Romania, began bank privatization only in the late In 2000, foreign investors owned less than half of Romanian banking assets and two of the three largest banks remained stateowned as late as 2003. Beginning in 1995 with virtually no Although the Czech government In Croatia, only one small foreign bank was operating in 1995 and there was hardly any foreign ownership of With some inducement from the G7 donor countries and international financial institutions, Polish authorities set a three Investment funds, the largest of which were created by these banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher privatization program. Hence, this initial divestiture of state holdings resulted in interlocking ownership with the state retaining large controlling stakes of voucherprivatized Czech banks. At the end of 199
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