【正文】
x u1(c1, c2*) = v1(c1 + c2*) + w1 – c1 subject to 0 ? c1 ? w1 11112112110 s o m ef o r ,1)( :A s s u m e1*)( 01*)( :FO Cwrrvccvccv???????????May 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 5 19 Contributing to a public good ? How to find a Nash equilibrium ? Solve person 2’s maximization problem Max u2(c1*, c2) = v2(c1* + c2) + w2 – c2 subject to 0 ? c2 ? w2 22222122120 s o m ef o r ,1)( :A s s u m e1)*( 01)*( :FO Cwrrvccvccv???????????May 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 5 20 Contributing to a public good ? How to find a Nash equilibrium ? The contribution pair (c1*, c2*) is a Nash equilibrium if 222211112122110 s o m ef o r ,1)( 0 s o m ef o r ,1)( :As s u m e1*)*( 1*)*( wrrvwrrvccvccv??????????????May 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 5 21 Contributing to a public good ? Best response function ? Person 1’s best function to person 2’s contribution c2: R1(c2) = r1 – c2 if c2 r1。 =0, ow. ? The quantity that consumers demand from firm 2: q2(p1, p2) = a – p2 if p2 p1 。May 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 5 1 Static (or SimultaneousMove) Games of Complete Information Bertrand Model of Duopoly Contributing to a Public Good May 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 5 2 Outline of Static Games of Complete Information ? Introduction to games ? Normalform (or strategicform) representation ? Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies ? Nash equi