【正文】 對利率和銀行體系的準(zhǔn)備金規(guī)模施加影響 ) Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 1310 Functions of the Federal Reserve Banks ? Clear checks支票清算 ? Issue new currency貨幣發(fā)行 ? Withdraw damaged currency from circulation回收流通中破損貨幣 ? Administer and make discount loans to banks in their districts管理和向本地區(qū)商業(yè)銀行發(fā)放貼現(xiàn)貸款 ? Evaluate proposed mergers and applications for banks to expand their activities評估提出的合并案與銀行擴(kuò)展業(yè)務(wù)的申請 Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 139 Federal Reserve Banks (cont’d) ? Member banks elect six directors for each district。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 138 Federal Reserve Banks ? 準(zhǔn)公共機(jī)構(gòu)，部分私有部分政府所有，股東來自聯(lián)邦儲備體系在各區(qū)的成員私人商業(yè)銀行 Quasipublic institution owned by private mercial banks in the district that are members of the Fed system ? 成員銀行選取 6名聯(lián)邦儲備銀行董事 Member banks elect six directors for each district。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 136 FIGURE 1 Structure and Responsibility for Policy Tools in the Federal Reserve System Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 134 Should Price Stability be the Primary Goal? ? In the long run there is no conflict between the goals ? In the short run it can conflict with the goals of high employment and interestrate stability（如經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張期，失業(yè)率下降，經(jīng)濟(jì)過熱，通脹上升，為穩(wěn)定物價，央行提高利率，該措施會減少就業(yè)和投資） ? Hierarchical mandate階梯目標(biāo)（只有實現(xiàn)物價穩(wěn)定的情況下才能追求其他目標(biāo)，如英格蘭銀行、加拿大銀行、新西蘭儲備銀行和歐洲中央銀行） ? Dual mandate（雙重目標(biāo)）：即將物價穩(wěn)定和就業(yè)最大化兩個目標(biāo)放在平等的地位上 ? 物價穩(wěn)定應(yīng)當(dāng)是貨幣政策首要的長期目標(biāo)，但由于貨幣政策同樣關(guān)注產(chǎn)出波動，物價穩(wěn)定的目標(biāo)只有在長期的條件下才被作為首要目標(biāo) Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 132 The Price Stability Goal（物價穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)） ? 物價穩(wěn)定即通脹率保持在穩(wěn)定的低水平 Low and stable inflation ? Inflation – Creates uncertainty and difficulty in planning for the future – Lowers economic growth – 破壞社會結(jié)構(gòu) Strains social fabric ? 名義錨是鎖定物價水平以實現(xiàn)物價穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)的名義變量，如通脹率或貨幣供給 Nominal anchor to contain inflation expectations ? 名義錨能限制時間不一致問題 Timeinconsistency problem（指建立在自由放任和頻繁調(diào)整基礎(chǔ)上的貨幣政策會導(dǎo)致長期的不良后果） ? 名義錨就像行為規(guī)則，通過約束自由放任政策的預(yù)期，有助于避免貨幣政策中的時間不一致問題 Copyright 169。Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 13 Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System 中央銀行與聯(lián)邦儲備體系 Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 133 Other Goals of Moary Policy ? High employment ? Economic growth（貨幣政策能促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長嗎？） ? Stability of financial markets ? Interestrate stability（有助于穩(wěn)定經(jīng)濟(jì)活動和金融市場） ? Foreign exchange market stability Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 135 Origins of the Federal Reserve System（聯(lián)邦儲備體系的起源） ? Resistance to establishment of a central bank抵制中央銀行的建立 –恐懼中央集權(quán) Fear of centralized power –對金融業(yè)持懷疑態(tài)度 Distrust of moneyed interests ? No lender of last resort最后貸款人缺位 – Nationwide bank panics on a regular basis – Panic of 1907 so severe that the public was convinced a central bank was needed ? Federal Reserve Act of 1913 –制約平衡 Elaborate system of checks and balances –分權(quán) Decentralized Copyright 169。 2020 Pearson AddisonWesley. All rights reserved. 137 FIGURE 2 Federal Reserve System Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Copyright 169。 three more are appointed by the Board of Governors – 成員銀行選舉 3名 A類董事 Three A directors are professional bankers – 成員銀行選舉 3名 B類董事 Three B directors are prominent leaders from industry, labor, agriculture, or consumer sector – 3名 C類董事代表公眾利益 Three C directors appointed by the Board of Governors are not allowed to be officers, mploy s, or stockholders of banks Copyright 169。 three more are appointed by the Board of Governors (cont’d) – Designed to reflect all constituencies of the public ? Nine directors app