【正文】 Nashequilibrium can evolve – where all can benefit consistently. There is a heavy reliance on the accuracy of the information being exchanged between the colluding agents for the coordination of the collusive arrangement. One could imagine a collusive arrangement occurring within a larger collusive arrangement as one agent attempts to gain petitive advantage over the other colluding agents – such is the Prisoners dilemma (the difficulty of deciding when to cooperate and when to harvest the relationship for selfish benefit). Just as the principal cannot ensure a supervising agent is acting in its best interest, colluding agents cannot be sure that their partners are honest (Vafai, 2005). And, unfortunately, the control measures and investigative techniques that can be used to improve the likelihood of best interest actions or honesty can cost more to utilise that the likely benefit of use – resulting in a possible disutility of effort in attempting to reduce disutility of effort!Interestingly enough, even if the agents that a principal is confronted with are colluding to skew the cost of information/task rent, exogenous transaction parisons can give reference for agency cost allocation and distortion (FaureGrimaud et al., 2001). A keen eye trained on petitor cost allocation (external to the organisation) can act as an alarm bell for identifying the collusion of agents in the supply chain.If the principal is requiring the use of agents because they are the ones with the greater information powerbase then the story is different again. Competitive strength is lost when the principal is misinformed or receives biased information under the guise of being hard facts which “…can be obtained only through monitoring, contracts depend on the monitor’s report.” (Vafai, 2005. pp20). From this we can see that if an agent [agent 1] is required to do the monitoring of other agent(s) [agent(s) 2], then [agent(s) 2] need only collude with/bribe [agent 1] in order to obtain a favourable contract. If the contract is overly favourable to the agents then it could potentially be devastating to the principal (although devastating to the point of collapse would not be in the agents interest as it still requires the price in exchange for the rent).The measuring and monitoring of the agents, in order to maximize the extraction of rent or secure favourable contractual agreements, is evidently expensive and confusing yet incredibly critical to an organisations petitive successes when agents are colluding in the market place. For this reason I feel there is significant necessity for me to engage in research with the objective of ‘Developing a framework for identifying a Principals ideal course of action in an environment rich in agent collusion’MethodologySeveral central issues need to be resolved before research into ‘Developing a framework for identifying a Principals ideal course of action in an environment rich in agent collusion’ can be seriously undertaken:s profit.” (FaureGrimaud et al., 2001. p1). In which case it is in the principals (firms) interest to use systems that ‘discourages’ (for want of a better word) collusive side contracting of intermediary agents as this avoids the possibly inefficient ramifications (increased cost and decreased effort/likelihood of success) of collusion on petitive advantage. One could perhaps analogise this to owning an SUV and being unable to sell or trade it while someone else inflates the price of the petrol that you have to buy to run it. The question is as to whether or not the ‘collusionproof’ organization design is really collusion proof. Or referring to the SUV example: the question is whether or not a new engine will get around the control of the petrol prices. The truth seems to be, with a somewhat philosophical ring to it, that there is no truth, no collusionproof organisational design, only circumstantial idealised courses of action.The benefits to agents when colluding is obvious。 Panova and Rangel, 2002) but Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) identifies that in an exchange situation the individuals involved evaluate losses and gains (referenced against a relevant relative heuristics) subjectively thus ing to different conclusions on the value of action. This is entirely dependent on the individual parties’ information base from which they draw, an assumedly, rational conclusion (as irrational conclusions and action may negate the exchange entirely). Because of the variations in weighting resulting from asymmetric informational bases the utility expected from the exchange varies along with the negotiation and directly affects the actual utility they receive.When agents are hired a contract is formed (the type of contract depends on the or