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Vishny, 1999b,Investor protection and corporate valuati。最后我們發(fā)現(xiàn)大股東的這種隧道挖掘行為與上市公司的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。另外我們沒發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能對大股東的隧道挖掘行為起到制衡作用，這可能是因?yàn)闄C(jī)構(gòu)投資者代表的力量還不夠強(qiáng)大，也可能是它們并沒有起到監(jiān)督的作用而是起到“幫兇”的可能。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)集團(tuán)形式的大股東的隧道挖掘行為要顯著高于非企業(yè)集團(tuán)形式的大股東隧道挖掘行為。反而第三大股東較好地維護(hù)了中小股東的利益，這與第三大股東的身份有很大聯(lián)系。我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)非控股股東的存在對控股股東的隧道挖掘行為能起到顯著的制衡作用。但這種效應(yīng)并不是總是明顯的。我們的研究證明了我們的一些假設(shè)，也就是大股東的隧道挖掘行為有利益協(xié)同效應(yīng)和壕溝防御效應(yīng)同時(shí)存在。 通過上文的研究我們發(fā)現(xiàn)：我國上市公司中大股東通過隧道挖掘方式侵害中小股東的利益普遍存在。 總之，在現(xiàn)金股利的發(fā)放模型中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了大股東確實(shí)把它作為隧道挖掘的一種重要手段。一般剛達(dá)到不虧損的公司是不會經(jīng)常發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利的。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了這方面的證據(jù)，雖然在分年度中SOE不顯著，但在總樣本中ROE十分顯著。Lee等（2002）認(rèn)為現(xiàn)金股利是大股東進(jìn)行盈余管理的一種手段。該年度的盈利情況跟現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放有十分顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。DPSt1在各個(gè)模型中都十分顯著。這也符合投資者的預(yù)期，因?yàn)槿绻撃甓劝l(fā)放的股利比以前少，投資者就很容易認(rèn)為獲利少了。我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)很多機(jī)構(gòu)投資者中包括了基金管理公司、銀行信托公司等，隨著保險(xiǎn)公司等機(jī)構(gòu)的進(jìn)入，現(xiàn)金股利的發(fā)放將更加普遍。NO2，NO3在模型中不顯著，而且符號不見很穩(wěn)定，說明這些股東發(fā)揮的力量還十分有限。 對現(xiàn)金股利支付的檢驗(yàn) 預(yù)測符號 2001年 2002年 2003年 Total(Constant) ? * () () () ()Group + ** () () () ()NO1 + *** ** *** () () () （）NO2 （） （） （） （）Stake * ** （） （） （） （）NO3 ** （） （） （） （）DPSt1 + *** *** *** *** () () () ()ROAt1 + ** () () () ()EPS + *** *** *** () () () ()ROA + ** ** () () () ()SOE + ** () ()