managerialandindividualdecisionproblemsasymmetric管理和個(gè)人的決策問(wèn)題的非對(duì)稱(chēng)-wenkub.com
2025-01-14 04:00 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 so employer prefers more effort/care ? But no 1 to 1 relationship between effort/care and Q。 but there is no 1to1 relationship between effort/care and output More examples of scenarios in which moral hazard may arise ? Team work: Two students working on a team project worry that the other team member will do very little work but that the team member will claim that s/he put in a lot of effort but that what they tried to do proved very difficult and time consuming because of problems finding relevant data ? Borrowing: How careful an entrepreneur will be with the money loaned from a bank – the loan manager worries that the entrepreneur will gamble with the funds – take too many risks Basic idea underlying the moral hazard problem Agent performs action which principle does not see – agent prefers a different action to principle Oute depends on action of agent Principle contracts agent A game theoretic model of moral hazard in employment contracts ? Worker: Action = Level of effort/care. More effort gives negative utility to the worker。 high + 189。 bad drives out good Basic idea underlying the adverse selection problem Agent is a certain type/quality agent knows own type but principle does not Oute depends on type/quality of agent Principle contracts agent Adverse selection ? As principle doesn’t know agent’s type (. high or low quality) the contract will reflect this uncertainty payment based on expected (average) value rather than actual value . expected profitability of a new venture, expected ability of an employee – Proposed payment therefore less than value of high quality agents so high quality agents likely to reject contract and only lows will take contract。D Chance Ramp。 How do people decide what to do? Decision trees Dr Punter Invest in Ramp。D Chance Ramp。D succeeds M+w Ramp。 ADVERSE SELECTION bad drives out good – Principle’s payoff is low unless revises the contract downwards A game theoretic illustration of the general adverse selection problem Chance AH H L accept Payoffs Principle Agent AL accept high negative 0 0 low positive 0 0 c Principle, P: offers agent (A) a contract, c, based on average quality Chance/Nature determines agent’s type/quality: quality is high (H) or low (L)。 low Agent, A: knows own type: accepts contract if payoff is positive . value of contract is 0, rejects contract otherwise (payoff = zero) What kind of agent will accept the contract? What will the principle’s p
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