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哈佛大學(xué)博弈論課件-資料下載頁

2025-10-09 12:38本頁面
  

【正文】 (PBA + PBC 1)(UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC) Simplifies to... [b/(a + b + c)] (UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC) Translation: Validity ? What is the point at which B is indifferent? [b/(a + b + c)] (UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC) ? [b/(a + b + c)] = resources B can contribute ? (UBA UBC) = B’s motivation for A vs. C ? (KBA KBC) = B’s costs for A vs. C The decision to help in a dispute depends on one’s ability to influence the oute, one’s level of motivation, and the costliness of getting involved ? Calibration, parative statics, case studies are all ways of assessing model validity Final thoughts ? Given B is indifferent to allying when [b/(a + b + c)] (UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC), and ? [b/(a + b + c)] = resources B can contribute ? (UBA UBC) = B’s motivation for A vs. C ? (KBA KBC) = B’s costs for A vs. C Equilibrium, perturbed: ? If the lefthand side is the righthand side then B would rather partner with A ? What realworld events might prompt this?
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