【正文】
(PBA + PBC 1)(UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC) Simplifies to... [b/(a + b + c)] (UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC) Translation: Validity ? What is the point at which B is indifferent? [b/(a + b + c)] (UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC) ? [b/(a + b + c)] = resources B can contribute ? (UBA UBC) = B’s motivation for A vs. C ? (KBA KBC) = B’s costs for A vs. C The decision to help in a dispute depends on one’s ability to influence the oute, one’s level of motivation, and the costliness of getting involved ? Calibration, parative statics, case studies are all ways of assessing model validity Final thoughts ? Given B is indifferent to allying when [b/(a + b + c)] (UBA UBC) = (KBA KBC), and ? [b/(a + b + c)] = resources B can contribute ? (UBA UBC) = B’s motivation for A vs. C ? (KBA KBC) = B’s costs for A vs. C Equilibrium, perturbed: ? If the lefthand side is the righthand side then B would rather partner with A ? What realworld events might prompt this?